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CHAPTER I 
THE MAN AND HIS MILIEU 
To moat readers the name Charles Lesl1e Stevenson will mean very little. 
The two most obvious reason to_ this laok of tamiliarity are, first ot all, the 
tact that stevenson il a oontemporary, and seoondly, his limitation of the 
majority of hi. soholarly work to meta-ethioal qae.tions. Wheretore, a brief 
introduotion will be in order. 
Suoh an introduction must present the man, his milieu, and the man in his 
milieu. We shell begin by introducing Prof. Stevenaon in his individual and per 
sonal capaoity. Next we shall oonsider the philosophical milieu that 'W8, and is 
a main tactor in the development of hi. ethioal theory. Finally, we shall con-
sider Prof. Stevenson'. position and influenoe in that milieu. 
Chalre. Le.lie stevenson is professor ot philolophy at the University ot 
Miohigan at Ann Arbor. He was born June 27, 1908. In 1930 he reoeived his A. B 
trom Yale. Along with hie newly-wedded wite he sailed to England to study at 
Cambridge reoeiving his B. A. 1n 1933. He returned to Amerioa and reoeived hi. 
Ph. D. tram Harvard in 1935. FW·~remaiMd at Harvard as an ass1atant and then aa 
an instruotor in philosophy until 1939. It was during this stay at Harvard that 
hiB signifioant artiCle. on the "emotive theory" of meta-ethical analyeia 
appeared in Mind. 
1 
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The years from 1939 to 1946 saw Prof. Stevenson aGsume the role of assistant 
professor of philosophy at Yale. These were fruitful years whioh oulminated in 
Prof. Stevenson'. major work, Ethics ~ Language. In 1946 he held a Guggen-
heim Fello_hip and then .... nt to the University of Miohigan where he assumed 
the post of associat. professor pf philosophy. In 1948 he was made full profea 
aor. 
This brier biographical sketoh gives a very inadequate piotuee of Prof. 
Stevena on. It Deed. to be put into the tull.r context of Stevensont • philo8op 
ioal • ..,iromnent, beoaua. without the proper perspeotive Stevenaon'a partioular 
problem _y appear strange, unimportant, or even meaningle... He 18 in a par-
tioular philosophio stream, the analytioal, and unless we oonsider this tact we 
shall understand neither his proble. nor his method. 
One philosophio ourrent, or rather, a mere eddy at that time, in whioh 
stevenson found li .. elf when he went to Yale in the late 1920's was the anti-
idealistio, anti-rationalistio movement that G. E. Moore had set in motion when 
he oalled idealism into qJestion in 1903. The idealistio, retionalistio doc· 
trine and method that desired to gi ,-lit a total explanation of a 11 reality, a 
world view, .as first doubted and finally totally and oompletely rejected. Suoh 
rejection budded forth in the philosophioal writings of Moore and Bertrand 
Russell and pas.ed on to Ludwig Wittgenatein, to the logical positivists, end 
finally roade itself felt ln the thought of American realists. The non-idealist 
denied that philosophy must oonstruot a world view that enoompasses and illumi-
nates solenoe, art, morals, religion, and politios. l In this oontext of revolt 
1 Se. Morton Gabriel Wh1te_ The A e of Anal ai, (Soston, 1956). 
against the universal system, theWeltansicht, Stevenson began his philosophical 
studies. 
This revolt against idealism embraces three distinct movements in the phil-
osophioal worlde Cambridge analysis, logical positiviam, and pragmatism. The 
Cambridge analysis movement, also known as the British analytic or the ordinary 
language sohool, grew out ot the meticulous analysis practised without resort 
to toraalism by G. E. Moore over several decades. It was further inspired by 
the work ot ludwig Wittgenstein. whose Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus had playec 
a large part in the growth ot positivism, but who increasingly began to look at 
concepts not in termft of their definition or their individually ascertainable 
meaning, but in terms of the way their use showed up in everyday languge. 2 
The analytic SChool, if we may u.e the tera (the analysts themselves would deny 
that they tormed a Bchool), like the other two mentioned, pays little attention 
to any all inolusive systems, but concentrates on the task ot olarifying the 
issues raised in philosophical discussion. 
Logical positivism is the oontinental school of analysis originally known 
as the Vienna Circle. It is the movement of philosopher-scientists which at-
tempts to wed philosophy to science. Wittgenatein's presence at Cambridge 
brought the Cambridge analytiC school into contact with the logical pos1~ivi8m 
of the oontinent. Although logical positivism never has had much influence in 
!wittsenstein originally was very much intluenced by Bertrand Russellts 
mathematics and logic, but after 1920 his interest shifted more and more away 
from tormal logic and the exact sciences to the data of ordinary language. See 
Cont:10rar. PhilOSOEhy, ad. James L. Jarrett and Sterling M. McUurrin (New 
York, 954. pp. as: 4. 
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England, Englishmen auch a. A. J. Ayer who studied in Vienna have brought it 
home to England and consequently have served to point out the common ground of 
logioal positivism and cambridge analysis. Both bave had a common ground in 
their rejection of the traditional oonoeption of philolophy aa a ooncern for th 
ultimate nature of reality. They have found general agreement in their empiri-
eism~ their eechewing of metaphysioe, their agree.ive re.pect for loience, and 
1n their pursuit of analysis in the interest of the olarifioation of thought. 
But they differ in other reapeots. Britieh analY8i. hal largely followed the 
pattern laid down by Moore of .eeking indubitable grounds in sense data tor 
that which 11 lmo..rno the "mln in the .treet" by common place methods .. and bas 
refused to identify philosophy, ita program and method, with the .oienoe. to t 
extent to whioh this is done in p ositlvism and prag~tism. 
The third movement is basioally American. Pragmatism i. otten indiscrimi-
nately lumped with logical poaitiYisro under the pejorative title "Scientism .. " 
and, of coura., there are many bonda that link pragmatism to logical positivis 
Not P. tew thi1".kers of our times have a toot in each camp_ (Stevenson hin1lelt 
might b. numbered among these.) Prer,mst1em t s tradltioMl empiricism, its re-
spect for acienoe, and skeptical attitude to_rd JnetaphyslCl!ll dhculdone haTe 
made it a close relative of European analytic philosophy. "And, like British 
analytical philoao;lhy and J.ogical POSitivism, its rise hae been within a eon-
text of polemic against Idealism, Absolutism, and speculative philesophy 1n 
general.w3 It does differ trom analytic ph110.ophy, however. in the amount of 
3cont~orarl Philosophy, ad. James L. Jarrett and Sterling M. MoMurrin 
(New York, 54), p. 365. 
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edmiretlon tbet it ofters aoience. We shall see thet it is on th1e particular 
point that Prot. stevenson difters trom Dewey. 
These were the main influences that molded Prot. Stevenson's thinking in 
the development of hi. ethical theory. From 1930 to 1933 while he was at Ca~ 
bridge, he came in oontaot with the analytioal movement. He carried this in-
fluenee with him when he returned to do doctorate studies at Harvard. Although 
the analytical movel'D$nt •• practically non-e::dstent in Amerioa, stevenson con-
tinned to think along these lines. Publications coming from England, auoh as 
~. and A. J. Ayer'a work, lAnguage, Truth ~ Logic, whioh first Ilppeared in 
1936, kept him thinking in this framework. Shortly atter the publicaticn or 
Language, Truth and Logic, Stevenson oame to print with hie Mind articles which 
show a clo •• parallel to Ayerts .thloal position.4 
An important influence in the fornetlon ot Stevenson'a ethloal theory _a 
Ralph Barton Perry. Perry'. General Theory of Value appeared in 19M. At the 
time Btevenaon _8 doing dootoral stUdies at Harvard, Perry atill •• on the 
atatt. Sinoe Perry •• a naturalist, stevenson imbued with Cambridge's G. E. 
Moore and talk ot Moore's "natuntlilt1c rallacy," would rind points at contraet 
between Perry and Moore. Such contrast wouJid stimulate the 1, tellectually alert 
Stevenson to an al]8.1Y818 end evaluation ot both positions. For this reaeon we 
find the influence at both Moore and Perry in Ethio. ~ Langu~ge. 
4: (Alfred Jules Ayer. Le.1ualke, Truth and L1gb (London, 1936), p. 107. -We begin'DY admitting that the undamental etliIoa oonceptl are unanalyeable ••• 
Ayer explains this tact Wby a certain reeling in the speaker." SteTeneon. like-
whe, 'Wonld explain thil f'a('t by emotive meaning. There are also other examplea. 
6 
The pragmatic strain is the easiest to find and the easiest to verify in 
Prof. Stevenson's writin&s. time after time Stevenson points to John Dewey's 
influenoe on his conception of ethics. "My oonoeption of a personal deoision 
will not be new, I shall borrow most of it from John Dewey It . . . , Stevenson 
adraits. 5 This pragmatic h.tluenoe founded on the writings of Dewey mad.e its 
appearance after the ~ articles. 6 Stevenson's views on the subject of ethics 
iiDderwent certain changes froIn the time his articles appeared in!!!!! until 
Ethics ~ Laefauage. Aiken points out that one of' two changes was the influence 
01' Dewey's ethical philosophy.1 The view of Dewey which made itself felt in 
Ethics ~ Language is the now familiar doctrine that "ends-tn-view" are never 
really understood or properly evaluated apart from an understanding and evalua-
tion of their means. 
Having d.ealt with the philosophic theory and practice in general during 
Stevenson's formative years as a philosopher, we must examine the contemporary 
oonception of ethics beoause it has influenced Stevenson and has been influ-
enced by him and therefore offers the best baokground against which to view 
Stevenlon'. position. For Stevenson there are at least two distinctions to make 
in speaking 01' ethics. First is the distinotion between a broad sense of the 
term, which would include any evaluative decision, and the narrow sense of the 
5Charles L. Stevenson, "The Emotive Conoeption of Ethios and Its Cognitive 
Implications.-~ Philosophioal Review, LII (July 1950), p. 291. 
GStevenson published three articles on his ethical theory. January 1937 
(XLVI, 14-31), January 1938 (XLVII, 46-51), July 1938 (XLVII, 331-350). 
1aenry David .liken. "Etl::io8 and Language," !h!. Journal .2!. Philosophy, XLII 
(.lugust 16, 1945), p. 456. 
1 
term_ whioh includes only that evaluative decision involving peouliarly moral 
attitudes. "When we aot in aocordance with a pecuUarly moral approval, we 
have a secondary appro"t'lll, so to spealc_ whioh _kes us proud to recognl&e our 
priuary one. ttS 
Muoh moro important. however. is the d18tinction btttween norlDfltlve ethics 
and meta-ethios'. The contemporary moral philosopher tinds it convenient to 
divide ethics into two psrtS& (1) nonative ethics,. whioh aaks what things or 
actions are good. right, etc_, and oonsists ot ethloal judgm.nts proper~ i •••• 
judgments of value and ot obligation. (2) ethioal theory or mlta-ethioa, whioh 
alks suoh questions tUII "What is the mef\,ning of the term 'good. t 'right,' 
twrong.t eto_t" Ilnd oonaists not of ethical judgments. but at suoh logical, 
epistemologloel. or ontological statement. as "Good l!lltl1'l1l d.8ire." Ayer points 
out that .thical It ••• theory 18 .ntirely on the level of analye18J it is an 
attempt to show What people are doing when they _ke moral judgment •••• '. 
All moral theories, intuitlonlst_ nsturalistio. obj.ctivist, emotive, and the 
relt, in so tar aa they are philosophical theorie •• Are neutral as regards 
aotual oonduot. To speak teohnioally. they belong to the tield ot meta-ethica, 
not to ethics proper .... e Thus the re Is tion ot arJalytl0 to normati". ethics "'1 
be oompared to the wayan ability to de.oribe the ~lle. ot a game of ohea. 
atands to an ability aotually to play the game. The rul •• ot the game do not 
tell what move one should make at any speoitio point in an aotual game; nor 
doe. an exposition of the 1).l gio of ethioal ooncepts tell one how to behave in 
a"The Emotive Conception ot Ethios and Itl CognitlTe Implication"- p. 29~ 
9 Altred Jule. Ayer, Philolo hioal Es.a (London, 1954}, • 245-246.· 
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any aotual situation. 
A meta-ethics. then, is any theory whioh attempts to detine or to desoribe 
the way or ways 1n whioh moral judgments are actually used by hl.Ul¥l.n beings. 
'~ae theories are generally oonsidered to be of four types. Edwards breaks 
them down into intuitionism. objective naturalism. naive subjeotivism. and 
emotive theori~s.10 John Hospers breaka them down into objectivistic and .u~ 
jectlvistio naturalistic theoriee, t~ unique property theory and the emotive 
theory. 11 
We shall consider the Ol1tura li.tic theories first. The objectlvhtio 
theory naintaina th8t sinoe "X~h goodft is of the same graIll1Bltical form 88 "X 
is round," then goodness is like roundnea., end the word 'good' name. an objeo-
tive proptu·ty of X just .. I 'round' do.a--an ethical property in the one ca.e, 
a geometrical property in th~ other. 
Accordln(. to all subjectivistic theories, when one says that ftX 1. good," 
he 1s not saying that 1t has a certain objective property) he is only saying 
that he (or 80meone else) has a certain 6ttitude to-ward X. 
G. E. Moore is the prinoipal advocate of the unique property theory. In 
bb Prinoipia Eth10a (pages 9-10) Moore points out th&t 'good' is an indetilP'" 
able word, standing fer a property whioh is not analyzable into other proper-
tie.. 'Good'is; r.either verbally nor ostensively definable. Thus VOore formu-
lated hi. famoue "naturalistic tallaoy." the tallaoy of believing that goodne •• 
l°Paul Edwards. The Logio ~ Moral Disoourse (Glenooe, Ill •• 1955). 
IlJohn Rospers. An Introduotion to Phl1oloph1oal ~ly81. (Englewood 
Cllfts. lew Jer.ey. l~S), p. 456 11.--
is analYSAble into non-ethical terms or ne.tural properties. 
The formulations of the emotive theory are many, but they all agree at 
least in this, that all other theories err in attributing to ethioal terms a 
purely ~o~n1tlve (SOJllttimes the word used is "desoriptive") meaning, and there-
fore fail to reoognize that ethioal words are likewise emotive in their mean-
ing. The emotiv1ata agree with Moore that ethical terms are balically unana-
lyzable. lioore explains the unanalysabiUty of ethical terms by mean8 of 80me 
unique property, luch as the property to produoe happiness. Therefore 'good f 
i.e a word atflnding for this unique property of produoing happiness and cannot 
be analyzed 80 that it ste.nds for any other property. The same is true for all 
other ethical terms. The emotiviat, however, explains the unanalyzability ot 
ethioal terms by pointing to their emotive meaning. The meaning of an ethioal 
ter.m is emotive. It oannot, therfore, be analyzed '0 that it stands for any 
property or characteristic of things, that 11, for anythi14g Qogn1ti,.e. 'Good t 
has no cognitive meaning, but merely emotive. It is analysable in terms of the 
emotion ot approval and that i. all. 
Before oonoluding this ohapter by briefly indicating Prof. Stevenson's 
task in his ethioal writings and theorizing, a short summary synthesiling the 
diverse elements that have influenoed Prof. Stevenson is needed. The main 
stream of philosophical thinking in whioh Stevenson found himself when he was 
graduated trom Yale in 1930 surged with revolt again8t the Ab.olute and the 
Universal of the Idealists. The exact Bcienoe. had entered the philosophical 
arena through the influence of Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wlttgenstein, Moritz 
Sohliok, and the Vienna Cirole. Philo8ophers took over from the soienti.ta 
the prinoiple of verification and let up different oriteria to deterttdne When a 
10 
philosophioal sta:tem3nt is verified. In its beginnings, the Vienna Cirele de-
manded that a philosophical statement be empirioally verifiable to have meaning 
Whereas the philosophical trend prior to Steve!lson'a arrival at Yale ._ 
centered predominantly around the syntheaie or reality and the explanation of 
its totality. 80 a new trend arose with the an."llyt1e philosophers and centered 
upon an analysis of reality and an explanation of its parts. Just as _he main 
task of tho scientist was to analyze and delve deeper and d.eper into the parte 
of reality such as the &tom. the parts Qf theatom, and the parte ot the parte 
of tho atom, 60 the _in task of the philosopher alBo beearno ono of analylSil. 
By the tioo that Pl·of. Btevcn80n had gained his B. A. et Cambridge. G. E. 
Moore's ordinary language approach was far mOl'e influontie 1 on Stevenson than 
the for.mal. methodo~og1cal app»aach of the logical p08~t1vilt8. Stevenson re-
turned to Harvard to work on hh Ph. 1'. ,.,~th Hoore's Prit\c1:p!~ Ethice. still 
fresh in mind. 'i'he di*ision of ethics into nonntivo 8nd metR-ethios ~s 8S-
tablished, With Stevonson finding l"J1?'r.:y problems that interested him and that 
needed answering in the ~re~ of n~tD-ethlo8. Thus the vast majorit.y of hi. 
work oircles around the language of ethics as i8 evident from the title of his 
doctoral dissertation, 1!!!. El'uotive If.eaniD;§ ~ Ethioal Terms. In 1937 and 1938 
the r,reeter II8jority ot , is thout:hts on ethlos end emotive meaning found it' 
.y into }!ind. 
In these early writings of stevenson, the logio.-analytio influence stand 
out most clearly. But from. 1938 on Prof. stevenson came into gre!'ter oontact 
with pragll1l.tism., especially as taught by John Dewey_ Under Dewey's influence 
Stevenson realized the need to abandon a version of the emotive theory which 
held that 'good' is e. term which functions merely emotively. Although he found 
11 
aome ethioal terms nott"", other' be found to be prinerlly deseripU"e. Thus 
along If!th incorporating Dewey's thoughte on "end.-in-view." Prof. Steftn.8on 8,laO 
mod.ified his verelon of the aaotive theory when he e~me to proacnt Ethics ~ 
L8.~n"_~e in 194,4.12 
With this brief 'UJI'.lJ!'U"Y .8 baokground., an examination of Prof. Stevenson's 
taBle: 8.. ethical witter now present. itselt. At the YeI"1 beginning ot his _1n 
work, r.thl~. ~ Ulng\$ge .. Prot. SteTen.on p01nt& out thet this book ft ••• 
de .. 18 not with the 'Whole of e thiel, but with ft narrowly SpeC1811zod part of it. 
Ita first objeot 18 to olarity the meaning of the ethieP.l ter.ms--such terms a. 
'good,' fright,' , jUl!lt,' • ought .. ' fln~ eo on. It! seeoD.d object is to obllrt.oter-
he the gene"1 methods by which ethioal judgments can be proved or supported ... l 
Ste..,.neon goe. on to pa'mi: out that his ?fOrk 18 related to norntti"e ethics 1n 
JII10h the eame _"I thet oODoeptl)e 1 ftnlllya1tt end ed.entitle method f.re related to 
the soienoe!. 'rhus he _rns others not to e,rpeet to find in his book t.ny eon'" 
olusions .'bout whet conduot i.e right end Wft'JnC. 1he pnrpo,e of l:it Ituc!y is a.n-
.lytie and methodological. ItI~ hepet! to serd others to their tuk.s with clearer 
beads and 1 ••• ~.te~ll hab1t~ of investi[et1on • • •• The present volume baa 
the' 1 ilnited task of sharp.nine; the tooh which others employ •• 14, 
~l"hap. prof. St."enaonts task appears too limitec. To spend dl ot one's 
l2Aiken, "Etbios ~ IAnguage, It de'ftlopa thh o}:enge in "iews more tull¥. 
13Charl •• L. St.ven.o~ Ethio. a.nd ta~a§. (Ne. Haven, 1944), p. 1. Here-
~ft.r th1e book will be indicated •• 'It. 
-
U'Ibicl. 
12 
efforst on meta-ethical problema might leem to downgrade normstive ethios. 
Stevenson anticipate. thil oharle and points out that normative ethics i8 impol-
tant but thnt to make ethioal judgments is not part of the apeoial1 zed task that 
he has set himself. He triel to underatand what goea on in ethios without makin@ 
judgmentl. He goes on to ltate that if he hal not yet " ••• written on theae 
larger, normative problema, that is becau.e I have not gotten that tar. But ~ 
limited topio is by no means the only one that i8 "philosophical." I lay thi. tc 
guard against a mlaunderstanding. So long as I stop short of uairle; the nona-
tiv. terms ••• I may aeem to be trying to explain them a_y. But in faot I 
take their importanoe for granted, a. any sane an mu.t; and my effort to write 
on ethio. without using them ia aimply indioative of the apecialized nature 01' 
'IIl1 problema."lS 
Suoh ia the man and his milieu. luch is the task that he let. himaelt. In 
the following chapters we shall attempt to traoe Prof. Stevenson's ethioal 
theory. Suoh a work, of oourse, will be merely 8. IUlllDIIUY of his thought. But 
with suoh a aummary we will try to indioate the oore 1.lue or problem that lies 
behind all hil theorizing. Finally .. 1n the last ohapter .. we shall t.at the .: 
theory that Prof. Stevenson presents for intrinsio obherenoe and verifiability. 
lSCbarle. L. stevenson, "Brandt's Questiona About Emotive Ethios," ~ 
Philosophical Review, LIX (Oot. 1950), pp. 529-530. 
CHAPTER II 
STEVENSON'S E1'BICAL TEEORY IN SUMMARY FORM 
Thi8 ohapter looks first to the methodology Steveneon employe and then to 
the theory Whioh flows from it. The investigAtion of SteYeneon'. methodology 
begins with a disoue.ion of its origin and leads into a presentation ot the 
methodology itaelt. The oonsideration of Stevenson" theor,y, whioh covere the 
greater part of the ohapter, i. a summary of the pOSition oontained in Ethio' 
~ Language. 
Due to the tact that Prof. stevenaon t • ethical theory i. lntrin.ical~ oo~ 
neeted with his methodology, an understanding of hie theor,y denanda a prior un-
derstanding of his methodology_ Since he i. in the logioo-analytic philosophi-
oalbaokground, a. was shown in the la.t ohapter, SteTenion's method obviously 
partakes ot that envirol'Ullental lntluenoe. H~. main intereat, 11ke that ot G. E. 
Moore, Ue. in investigating nelther the truth nor the meaning of statements of 
ordinary life, Whioh as suoh he believe. to have a well-known meaning and to be 
I in many .ses oertainly true, but in giving an aoalysis of their meaning. 
This interest of Stevenson marely eohoes the analyst's oonoeption of the 
phil080pher's job. A. J _ Ayer haa stated that "it should now be sufficiently 
olear that it the philosopher is to uphold hi' olalm to make a speoial oontri~ 
tion to the stook of our knowledge, he DlU.t rIot attempt to form.ulate speoulativ41 
lAlan R. White, i. !_ Moone: ! Critical Exposition (Oxtord, 1958), p. 3. 
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truths. or to look for first principle., or to make ~ priori judgment. about the 
wall4ity ot our empirical bellet •• He must, in tact, contine himselt to works ot 
claritication and aDalysi., ot a sort which we shall pre.ently de.cribe. M2 
Stevenson's subjeot matter is ethioal disoourse. Hia method 1. analY81 •• 
Re points out this taot when he write. that "I am not u.lng ethical terms. but 
~m indioating how they!!! u.ed.-3 Hi. analy.i. bas a twofold purpos •• (1) to 
~larity meaning. (2) to characterize the general methods by whioh ethical judg-
4 ~nts can be proTed or aupported. Thu. belide. merely .eeking to clarity the 
~eaning of ethical terms, Prct. Stevenson " ••• leeks to give tull attention to 
~thioal methodology. emphasizing the interplay b.tween emotive and ••• criptlve 
meaning, dlapelling any impression that a moralist nut be irrational or dogat-
ic, and indioating the general cirou_tanoe. under which ethio!'! 1 arguments can 
~e re.olved by .oientitic means.nS 
With thil briet preface to wbAt Prot. Stevenson attempt. to do in hi. 
ethical works and the method that he u.e., we oan now explatn the theory itselt. 
The summary pre.ent.d, which indioat •• in a very brief fa.hion the oentral 
pointe ot the more important ohapterl, will limit it.elf to Stevenlon'. theory 
~a contained in Ethic. ~ Language, ainee i1 it he presente his matured and 
~eveloped thought on the subjeot of ethic •• 
2Language, Truth ~ Logic, p. 51. 
3Charles L. Steveneon, "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms," ~, XLVI 
(January 1937), p. 20. 
"EL, p. 1. 
-
6Ibid., pp. 267-266. 
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Prot. Stevenson begins his work with a chapter on Kinds ~ Agreement ~ 
!Dilagr •• m.nt. "OUr first question, though se.mingly peripheral, will prove to b4 
ot oentral importanoea What is the nature ot ethical agreement and disagreement? 
Is it plraUel to that tound in the natural soienoes, differing only with regard 
~o the relevant 8ubject matter. or 18 it of some breadly different sort1 ft6 He 
~ve. on to show that agreement and disagreement are of two types. Ther. is 
iagreement and dUagreement in beliet and in attit*d •• 
stevenson goes a .\p further in pointing out that most ourrent cono.ptione 
of what mekeo .. norJDEltiYe issue in the ethioal arenA limit disagreetl'J8nt to that 
ot belief. Such 1s I. A. Riohard.' Q ••• tacit oonception of ethical disagree-
ment. He takes it to be a kind of diaagre8lllent in belief.n ? stevenson holdl 
that etbical disagreement 11 twofold. This 11 o.ntral to hi. theory. 
When ethioal is.ues beoame oontroversial, they involve dieagree-
ment that 18 of a dual nature. There 18 almost in .... ltabJ:.ydiaagre.ment 
in belief, Whioh r.quIres d.tail.d, sensitive att.ntion; but there is 
alao diaagreement in attitude. An analysis which .eeks a full piotur. 
of ethica, in touoh with praotice, must be oareful to r.oogniz. both 
factor., neither emphasizing the former to the exolusion of the lat-
ter, nor the latter to the exolusion of the former. Only by thi. means 
can it reveal the varied funotions ot the ethioal terms, andi, .... 
clear howS the mothods ot .thios oompare with tho.e of the natura 1 soi.no.e. 
Stevenson t • oonolu.iona about diaagre.ment pr.pare the way for a atudy of 
7Ibld., p. 9. 
8Ibld., p. 11. 
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ethical term.. and the characteristic teature. of ethioal methodology. Thus 
in the seoond chapter ae deals with ft ••• both of theae topioal. but in a 
_nner that 16 deliberately oversimplified. In pleoe of II, detailed 8Q\lysis of 
ethioal judgments" it will provide only 'working models t for Ei nalya1a--defini-
tiona which approximate to ethical meanings with suffioient acouraoy to be of 
temporary help.H9 
The chapter deals with definitions and ztevenson melees it olear trom the 
outset that unlees the distinction between beUef and attitude is rl.ainta.ined .. 
ethios will beoOJrut a :tJl.rt of scienoe. Soience dee.ls with beliefs. Any detini-
tion. theretore .. which identifies the meaning of ethical terms with t}~t of 
aoientifio ones w.:..11 suggest that the questions of r1o~th"e ethios, like thoBe 
of aoienoe, give ria. to an agreement or diaagree~.nt that ia exclusively in 
belief. "In thls way. ignoring disagreement in attitude. it will lead to only a 
halt-picture, at best, of the situations in which the ethical terms are actually 
used."lO It is Deoessar,y to remember that there Bre ft ••• multitudes of famil-
iar cases in 'Which the ethical terms are used ill e .. y that is ~ exclullivelZ 
soientifio. and we must recognize n meaning Whioh Buits them to their additional 
funotion.- l1 
stevenson pre .ents a numbor of working model. such as. (1) "This ia 
wrong" .... ns .! disapprove 2!.. ~J !!!!2.!!.!.!!!. (2) "ThiB is good" means I 
appro.,e 2!..!1!!!J ~ ~!! .!!!l.U The working modele deal with the meaning of 
9.!1!!:!., p. 20. 
lOIbid. 
llibid. 
12Ibid., p. 21. 
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ethical terms. Thu •• to a'Void oontu.ion, St ..... n.on point. out that "throughout 
the pre.ent ohapter ••• and in .everal of the ohapter. that follow. the analy-
.i. of meaning. will empba.i&e agreement end disagreement in attitude. whereas 
the a~lye1a of method. will emphaa1ze agreement pnd disagreement in beUet."l3 
Although this 18 the ca.e, Stevenson mekes it olear th~,t beUefs hAve more than 
an inooneequent1Rl •• eoondary role in ethio ••• tSuoh a view is wholly fore1gn to 
t~ pre.ent work .. and foreign to the moat obdous facts of daily experienoe.,.l4 
Steven.on turns next to ethical methodolor,y~ i .• e., tho method of resolving 
ethioal disagreement. A p08sible .y of re8obtlon rests in the reasone the.t gao. 
be attaohed to an ethical judrment. Sllch a method moves from agreement in beUet 
to agreement 1n attitude. The o'Verl1mpl1f1Cfltlon of the \'-"Orking llloaels neoe.a1-
tetes a otlution touching lanruar-e f1edbiHty, thet 18, Stevenson oautions that 
meanings are more complicated th~n the working models indicate. Theref'r., the 
method of re.olving disagreement through the medium of ree80ns is not final. He 
.ummarl, •• hi. position thus. 
Th. ethi_l term. cannot be taken ., fUlly oom~rable to scientific on ••• 
They have II quad-imperative function which, poorly pre.erTed by the work-
ing model., Dlst be exp1.81ned with oareful !.ttention to emotive rueaniIlgJ 
and they haTe a de.oriptiTe funotion which i8 attended by ambiguity and 
vaguene.8. requiring til pe.rtioularly detaUed stl:dy of l1ngllistic flexi-
bility. Both of theae aspects of language are intimately related to ethi-
cal methodologyJ and slthough this relationship has as yet been studied 
only in a partia 1, imperfeot _y, enough hal been said to suggest an in-
ter.sting po.sibility. The reasone whioh sre given for an ethic~l judg-
ment, although open to the ordins ry t.sts 80 far as their own truth or 
fal.ity 18 oonoerned, may ~iV8 eup,~rt to the judgment in a way that 
neither inductive nor deductive logio canexhau8t1vely oharacterize, 
And whioh must therefore become the subject matter of a further type 
ot inquiry.iS 
l~Ibld., p. 23. 
-
14Ibid •• p. 24. l5Ibid., p. 36. 
-
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The tle:dbll1ty in lantWlge •• tr.anlfe.t.d in tbe working modele calls forth 
a study of language. ROW' ara emotive and d.soriptive _IUlingS related? Before he 
oan disouse thi8 relation. Stevenaon must first pro.ent his theor.y ot meaning. 
He conceives meaning a. a dispositional property of worda. for he finda the 
{,otlon of disposition (tendency, }.etent abUity) usetul in d.-Ung with the oom-
pl1cated oaunl situationa where aOM apec:U.tS.ed sort of event 1& a function ot 
any varieblea. Meaning otters suoh " otluul 81tuetion. "The rreard.ug of' a a1gn 
••• 18 not some specific psyoholog1efll prOee8E't th!:t attends the ,,1gn &t any 
one time. It 18 rather. diepoeitional prOFerty of the sign. where thG re.ponae. 
varying ,,11s12 wrying attendant oiroU1ll8UllOI!U!. eons1lte of p'ychologicl11 1'1"00 ...... 
•• in _ h.arer, and ..... h.r. the stu.ulul 18 hie hearing the sign." 18 11'..11 impUe •• 
ot oour •• , that the rebtton be1:"ften h.Aril'lp~ the dgn and tr.e re.'lotion to it 18 
an elaborate caulal ~neJ di.poaltionnl properties "elways involve 6 cnu3al 
mUleu."l1 
(frDm the h~f'rer18 m>1n't ':'It v1fm") or tho etir:rulu8 (tr)'fil th~ t,;paai;:el,tll poin.t ot 
v1ew' 18 • l"f!tnr;e of emotions."IS Descrlpt!:ve 1l10amirl.L b uot f.tS 08.ISY to pinpoint 
two q~ •• tlonl ariae ~bout it, 
1t(a) Whftt ktnd ot !:,l'JyoholC1f!:l~ 1 proceaneo 1.8 .. sit,;n. in virtue of it .. d •• • 
16lbld. "'. 54. 
_'t" 
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(b) How do desoriptive meanings attain the preaision that is needed for 
19 praotioable oommunication?" To the firat of the.e question. Stevenson ans· 
wers that a sign's desoriptive meaning i8 its disposition to produoe cognitive 
mental prooesse.. The aeoond question is answered by a consideration of the 
20 tunotion ot linguistic rule., whioh relate symbols to eaol: other. 
stevenson proceeda to show the interrelAtionship of emotive and deaoript!"'. 
meanings, although he admit. that at this stage of the analysis such a demon-
stratton 18 oversimplified. The interrel!1t\onshlp does point out a diversity 1n 
emotive meaning; especially important is thF,t of dependent and independent 
emotive meaning. "To whatever extent emotive Jnef1Ining is not a funotion of de-
-
script!ve meaning, but either persist. without the latter or survives cha:ng •• 
in it, let us say that it 18 tindependent.' Thus nonmetaphorical interjectlol18 
will have a wholly independent enot1ve ll'.89ning, but most wordt, in(~luclil'li 'd ... 
moor.oy,' ••• and so on, will bave an emotive meaning Which is independent 
only in pe.rt. On 'the other mnd, to whatever extent emotive lne!!.ning ia a func+ 
t10n of deecrlptive meaning. ohar.ging with it after only briet I lag, t let 1.08 
•• y that it 1s tdependef~,·21 
Finished with his study of language. steven!on introduce. his "First Pat-
tern of A.nalylia. w If we are to take proper account of linguhtic flexibility, 
.e BlUst diVide our .tudy into two -pert., or 'p&tterne' of ene-lysiS. The first 
19Ibid.. p. 62. 
20Ibid •• p. es. 
21Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
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pattern will be simply ftn arte •• ion of the ll(Orking modele of Chapter III. The 
vegueneu of the ethioal terms will be removed, as an illustration of one of the 
possibilities, by li1:lS.tinr, their desoriptive referenoe to the speaker', own 
attitude •• n22 
An example of. en ethioal term shrouded in vay,ueness i& the ter.m 'good.' 
Aa G. E. Moore pointed out, 'good' i. unanalyzable and, ther.fore~ indefinable. 
For a term to be definlifble it lllUflt be an8.1yzable into simpler oognitive meaning. 
which directly or ir.dlreetly correspond to natural oropertiel. 'Good' i8 lode-
finable, aeeordi.n~ to }loore, beofluse i.t ea '.not be analyzed into e1mpler oogn1-
tive J:~eQnings due to the fflf't thflt 'good' eorresponds to no DIltural property_ 
Stevenson, howerer, e~1e.1n8 t)'le indefinability of 'good' 1n terms of its in-
&b1l1ty to be et11lyzed into simpler oognitive meanin, dnoe the balio meaning 
of 'good' is amative. ft~he term '~oodt 1. indefinable, then, if a definition 
is expeoted to preserve its oU8tOmR~ emotive meaning. It hal no e~ot emotive 
equi ~ lent •• 23 
'Good' ~nd most ethioAl term8, nevertheless, have ~ dual tunction. "For 
the oontexts that are most tYl'):ioe.l or nOl"tIIIltive ethica, the ethical terms have 
24 
a funetion that i8 both embtive and descriptiye." The desoriptive function 
because of its flexibility require. attenti". consideration. 'Good· can be 
given~ desoriptive meaning thAt i. quite complicated. In such a CAse the des-
22Ibi ... , p. 89. 
23rM,d., p- 82. 
24Ibid., p. 84. 
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Iorlptive meening e8n be Tl.riouely related to the emotive meaning. "A great part 
of the term's emotive mef\ning may ••• be dependeE: on the descriptive meaning, 
elieiting the heerar' e revor only fiB a oonsequenoe of' tirat pre.enting him with 
26 belief. about quaU,ties that he •. dmir ••• • But 1f 'good' 18 tr iTen a desorip-
tive meanl12g tMt if; relatiYely sUnpl ... its lilore oomplicated .ense .y red.1n in 
the forrn of' cognitive suggestions. "Muoh of the emotive meaning -y then be 
I quasi-dependent , eHoiting the heerer' 8 f'f'I.vor r.ot by definitely de.igMtlng 
26 
qual 'I tie. t~t he admires, but si.mply calline-. them to mind in III ftgue "y." 
Of course, eTen when the greAter ~ rt of' the meanint; of 'good t 18 depend,JItIt.or 
qoesl~dependent, there r~lns it. indenendent «MotiYe meening. -..-.~--
stevenson ends the oMpter with,. tftW re_rlte about ethical natllraU ... and 
non-naturt'lism. He oonsiders himself a natur!ll.li8t. The non-naturalist, in an 
effort to eaoape the peril of }Ioore', "Naturali8tic Fallaoy,·27 .. intain. that 
28 
'gl')odt must be an indefinable quftlity. As we have seen earUer, 8te".n80n ex-
plaine the indefin8billt.y of ·~ood,' not in terme ot aome non-natural quality, 
but 1n terms or amotiTe meaning. Hernaintaina, therefore. that the "Naturali.-
tic Fallaoy" 1s itself a fallacioue argument sinoe it faila to provide a dia· 
tinotion betften normatlYe ethios end 801enoe. Ethloal judgments bave amoldine 
influenoe upon attitudes 'WI,loh scientifio facts do not have. An arJot..lys18 whioh 
finds in ethioal judgments emotive meaning and the possibility of di8a~reen.nt 
in attitude doe. not fail to dietingui.h between normative ethios and .clenoe. 
26Ib1d. 
210. E. Moore, Principia Ethlc~ (cambridge, 1903), p. 9 ft. 
2Ssee p. 19. 
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~ •• St.yenso~. 8S an ethical naturalist, cen explain the indefinability of an 
ethical term like tgood I without" ••• multiplying entities beyond necesaity. 
t1nbss ths non-naturtll quality can ba defended on more posit!.,.. grounds, it :must 
~e taken as all ill'V'1a!ble ahadow cast by oonfu8ion and e)J.otl.,.e mefl.ning.,,29 
Chapter V contixme. ill the framework of the Fir'st Pattern Anaqa1a, bQt ill .. 
",t_d of oODBideJ'1ng meaniIlf it deals with the _thod of reeolving ethioal d18-
~gree_nt. Aa with the working models, 80 iH the first pattern, supporting rea-
.ons play the _.10.1' role of resolving ethical <1isagreemont. For the .moat part th4 
su.pporting reasons n.re relnted to the judgment psyohologically rather than 10,i-
lOelly. "They do not striotl¥ imply the judgment in the _y that !i.Xioma impq 
ftheorems} nor are thtty relllted to tha judgments inductively, AS statements de-
t-orUriDg obsaJ'Vf1t1on8 ere related to scientific law •• P1tther they 8UP10rt the 
judgment in the .y that reasons support ~rative.. They servo to intensity 
and render more p8rJn1!nent the influenoe upon attitude. which emotive :roeanilli o&n 
otten do no nor. than begin. This 1.8 possible w}·enever attltudee are functions 
ot beliefs ... SO 
A number ot e:P.nmples 80rve to l11ustrete the modus operandi of the.e 8U,.. 
porting reelons. rhe e::xamples ere divided into tc.l\.\r _in ,1'OUP" examples 111us-
t"'bing 80rne of the _ys in which (1) ethical _thod. resemble raotufll onea, 
(2) empiric •. l re.sons limited to the IlIlture end direct consequenoes of' that whic) 
18 judged are psychologies1ly related to an ethloel judgm~Ult, (3) empirioal 
.1' .... 01). not limited to the nature and direct oon.equence. of toot whioh 11 judge4 
are peyohologlce.lq related to an ethical judgment. (4) the forces of .. dilcon-
29 IL. p. 109. 30Ibid., p. 113. 
eerting influence are evaded, or the ~.8n. by which lt 18 exerted are altered. 
An example ot the rirft group 11. 
Aa It would be a good thing to have 8 dole for the unemployed. 
Bl But you bave just said that B dole ~uldweaken people" .ense of inde-
pendenoe, and you heve admitted that nothing which has that consequenoe il good. 
Stev.n.on pre.ente several suoh example. for eaoh group_ 
Atter theae examples Stevenson spend •• ome time pointing up the parallels 
between the interpersonal deoisions which his analysis has been dinly oonsider-
ing and pe reonal decisions. In the ina.rpersonal aspeot. of ethical method the 
supporting reasonl hftve the inetrumental task of eupportint e view that one per-
Ion is recommending to another, or of criticizing a view that the other is re-
conmending to him_ But peraoDRl deoisions allo have a plaoe in ethical disous-
8ions. The interpersonal aspecta are ot " ••• unquestionable interest, but 
they are not representative ot all ethical reasoning. Tblre are times when a 
perlon is faced not with the need ot oon'Vinoing otherl, or del1berating with t; 
them, but rather with a problem ot oonvinoing htmaelt. n3l 
The need or !'I perlonal ethical decidon arises from a confliot, ft a oon-
flict of attitude •• The individual's attitude • •• ~ apeak with one voioe, but 
urge him both th1a _Y And that, with the net result ot leaving him in a painful 
and inaotive state of irresolution. Conflict and ethioal indeoision are the 
same) and indecision i8 replaoed ~I deoision on:y when confliot is re.olved. n32 
31Ibld., p. 130. 
32Ibid., p. 131. 
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Thus it op.n be seen that the persol"al f)speots of ethics ere not very differe:lt 
from the interperson~l ones. The former involve conflict; the latter. when they 
are controversial. involve disagreement in attitude. "Conflict And disagreement 
in attitude are much the 88me, linoe confliot oocurs ••• when nn individual 
disagree. in attitude with Mms6lf. So the personal aspect of ethics reveal the 
same opposition within en individual thf\t has previously been seen 'With a 
group."!! 
Stevenson 0108es the chapter r,ith a disoussion of "The Degree to Which 
Ethioal Methods Can Approach Finality." If the method 1s oonoerned merely with 
the workings of formal logic. the 10(,io ot the method can ofter a disproof' or 
provide" ••• neeonary Dondi tiona to the rati:rme.l acceptanoe of normatiYely 
M interesting ethioal judgment •• but not 8uffioient on ••• " It the supporting 
reasons are empiricel. they too oan offer a d1sproBr of the other perlon's be-
Hefs. y.t this is not to say that abs~)lute certainty oan be reaohed oonvinoing 
to all. ~en a speaker's judgment is supported or attacked by empirical reasona 
psycholoelcally relBted to it# it i8 even more obYlous that no exhaust1y. method 
convine lng to e 11 people under Ii 11 e irCUInatf nces.. oan oonflcient ly be hoped ':;:" 
for.- 35 Granted the assumption that all disagreement in attitude 1. rootod in 
d1sagreem.ent in be lier, ethics 1 agnemert can be attain~d. 
!!Ibld. 
M 1b1d., p. 136. 
35Ibld. 
Yet an as.umption 'tihet ia not fanta.tie 'fJ.ey nevertheless be 
talae, nor have we aDIJ trustworlhy a .. urance that it 11 true. Our 
conclu.iolll about the finality of rational methods in ethics must 
aooordingly be hypothetical, 
It any ethioal di8pute 11 rootod in disagreement in beliet, it 
may b..-settled by rea.onin, and inquiry to whatever extent the be-
liefa may be 80 settled. But if any ethioal dispute is not rooted 
In disagr!gment in belIet6 then no reasoned solut10n ot any sort 1. 
posBible. 
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In Chapter VI Prof. Steveaaon considers the place ot persuA!lon in ethioal 
dilputes. The methodl to resolve ethical disputes 08n be of two kind •• Beside. 
the rational method., whioh inolude the supporting ",slons already metdllolled, 
there are nonratioDill .. thodl. One of these nonrrat1onal methods, and the most 
important aooording to stevenlon although he ofters no r.asons tor ita lmpor-
tano., 11 persua.ion. Persuadon" ••• depends on the aheer, direot emotional 
impaot of worde--on emotive meaning, rhetorical cadenoe, A~t metaphor, stentor-
ian atlmlatln.g, or pleading tone. of voioe, drame.tio ge.ture" oare in eete.b-
lilhing rapport with the hearer or audience" and so on. ,,37 Again I para 11e1 oan 
be made bet .... n interper.otUll and peraonal d8Oisions. Whereas persuadon is used 
in interpersonal deoisions, self-persuasion 1s USed in personal decisions. 
Prof. Stevollion next tt'eats the problen: of Vfllidlty. EEl cOlllp8-res validity 
in ethios with yalidlty in induotive lnd deduotive logio. - ••• when ethios 
usea the methods of logio or 6cience directly" the ordinery oanons of validity 
remain in full operation. On the other hend, vali(Uty has nothing to do with 
361bid., p. 1S8. 
37Ibid., p. 139. 
-
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persuasive methods. It 11 oogn1t1vely non.enlioal *0 *peak either of '.,...114' or 
of 'innl1d' perauasion_,,38 stevenson aotually goe. on to show thst there is 
no comparison between the two. The step from supporting reesons to an ethical 
oonoluaion 1.s utterly d1fterent trom any found in logio or loience, nand oannot 
39 
expeot to be wlid in the aame .y." It 11 true that wherever !'In ethioal ar-
gument 1a taotual, its methodology falh within the widely .tudied fields of 
logio and soientifio method. But in oases thAt go beyond these and " •• _ use 
beli.ts in their turn to alter attitude., que.tions about ft l1dlty. in any 
helptul senae of the term, ere irrelevant. ft40 
Validity 1, one thing. What method to use in reeolTing ethioal questions is 
another. The latter que.tion 18 evaluative. Evaluation is ft I10ndltive netter. 
"To evaluate or reoommend an ethical method ••• 18 to moralize about the .ya 
ot moralists.tt4l This Stevenson tries to avoid. Although an effort to .1udge 
ethical _thods .y be and 11 of unquestionable importanoe, Ethios ~ Language 
ft ••• doe. not propo.e to join in the undertaking. lave in passing. The method. 
of ethios muat for the pre.ent be seen, all preis. or condemnation of them being 
withheld. ,,42 
In the tollowing ohapter Prot. Stevenson trents of intrinsio and extrinsic 
38!bid •• p. 152. 
39lbld., p. 153. 
40Ibid •• pp. 155-156. 
41,I,bid., p. 159. 
42.I,b.l;!. , ~h 160. 
27 
~lue. The distinction often made between en intrinsic good (an end) and extril~ 
sic goods (meana) stevenson find. un.atisfactor,y. Along theae l1li~s Dewey's in-
~luence is e.pecially m&nifest. Stevenson, following Dewey, maintains tt~t in 
forming a moral judgment a oonaiderl'ltion of meRna is ablolutely necenary. He 
conclude. thet 1t ••• a study of meant 115 wholly indUpensAble to ethiOl'!, if 
moral judgments are to have effeotive support. 1t43 
In Chapter U Prof. Stttven.on considers the seoonn pattftrn of a~a lye is • 
This pattern intimately ties up with persuasive definitions. Before ~ consider 
the precise nature and function of per.ueaive definitions. the dhtinguhhing 
teatures of the .eoond pattern need to be clarified. "In both petterns the ethi-
Ioal tenu are considered a8 emotively .ative, for in other CBBOS there 1.s no 
~cul18r lingui.tic or methodological problem. There is in both pettarns a180 
".n emphasia on disagreement in pttitude. The distinf"uhhlng fefltures of the .ee-
pnd pattern, then, lie 801ely in the added desoriptive meanln[ that it prOVide., 
".nd the complications of methodology t~t arise a8 a eonaequenoe.1t44 
Sinoe a habitual part of the methodology of the seoond pettern rests on 
~r8uaalve definitions, 8 rew worda muat be said about them. In any per8U8sive 
~etlnltlon the term defined 18 e. taJnil!er one. whose meaning is both strongly 
~motive and descriptive. "The purport cf the definition is to alter the deaerip--
~lve meaning of the term, usually by givlnf it a Freeter preoision within the 
~01lllldark.. of ita ouatoary va~uene8S J but the definition doee not In''ke any .ub-
43Ibld •• p. 201. 
44;bld., p. 206. 
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The perluasive detinition is used. consciously or unc<:>n8cionely, to .ecure 
by the interplay between desoriptive and emotive meaning~ 8 redir~(}tion ot peo-
pleta attitude •• Having established the nature and function of persueei •• defin-
it1ons. Stevenson prooeeds to l11ustX'f".te the role of' these definitions in 8th1-
cal theory. An exe..mple that StaVltntHln off'er8 i.e Plato's aeeking in the ~epuhU.c 
whether justioe is virtue t.nd wisdom. or evil FInd folly. If the definiMon of 
J.lstlee is to be persuasive it must keep its le.udRtory 81"'ot:t.'\I'e mesHi.ne;. 
In the tollow1.ng cihapter the second pe.tteJ"n is diRc\U!l88d. It 18 like the 
first exoept ror oe1"tain "xternftl aspects. 'rhus tl'lb eonclusion8 HI! de~loped tor 
the first pattern oan be extended to the seoond without essential ohange. In 
oonsidering methcdology for the seoond pattern the place)f perenea10n stands 
out more clearly. 
The effeot 01' any perl.lluftsive atatement Hes if, t'e oombined UB!! or 
both emotive and descriptive meanings. Thh is true not mere!,. becauee 
persuasion 1s so habitually accompAnied by re~~ons. or beo~uee emotive 
meaning 18 So otten dependent on d.eor1ptive meaning. it 11 twe quit. 
independently of that. For when emotive !'!_!l1.n~ preieee or oondemn$, 
desoriptive meaning muet indicate the objeot on which praiae or oon-
de~~tlon is beBtowed. ~lthout both Borts of meaning. acting totetber, 
the perlualion Witt iack either foroe or direction. Although a per-
suaBive statsment ne81 not give new in'trmatlon about anyobjeot. it 
must at least center the emotive influence on an object thet is dee 
eerlptively designated.4S 
It must be pointed out that the difference between the definitions th*t typify 
the two patterns has no bearlcg on the nature or outcome of etUeal erguments. 
45Ibid •• p. 210. 
46 ~., p. 221. 
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The rea80n relts on the faot that in ethioal arguments the ethlo~1 terms are 
~ and not merely studied in 8. detached way. To !!! ethlcel terms is to ex-
ert an effort, even if only en initial, tentative one, to influenoe .thers. AI-
though the second pRttern permits this persuasive effort to be medi~ted by de-
tinitionl and the flr~t pattern does not, it remeins the 0&8e that for every 
second pattern detinition there is a first pattern .J,!ldr)Mnt. the latter being 
the pereuash"e connterpart of the former. 47 
This pare-.llel between the first a nd the second patterns of "naly81s alao 
rntItni.feste itself in regards to personal and interp.reonel decisions, intrinsic 
and extrinsic p;oods. and perluf'lsive method .•• "Little need l-.e 8f'1.id I!IbolJ.t person-
a1 deoisions, for the parellel between the two pattern.# and the equally clos. 
pBrallel between per.onal and interpersonal decldons, wi 11 l!l9ke the ll1ltter a1-
molt .elt-eJq>lanatory.-48 The discussion of fntrins1.c end extrinsio VB 111e in 
the 8eoond pattern. however, ft ••• cannot be made to oenter on the definitions 
of the terms 'intrinsically good' or'extr1nsieally good'. but the SRme aonsid-
eTAtions reappear in a n~ phraseolory. The differenoe between the patterna. 
here as 1I"bewhere, 18 only of linguistio intereat .. It hRs no b8f1r1.ng on the 
nature ot ethicRl disae;reero0nt or on the erlent to 'IlJl,ich it Mn lJe resolved. n49 
Prot. Stevenson ooncludes the chapter by pointing out the faot that sinoe 
47Ibid •• p. 229. 
48Ib1d •• p. 238. 
49 ~., p. 240. 
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the £1rst pattern usee jud'!!nts and supporting re9.sons th!>.t ctlO be emotively 
active ft ••• persuasion need be neither more nor le88 common in the second 
pattern than in tho .:'irat. And the patterns have been ahwwn to be parallel in 
all other centrEll NSpectS. We JD9.y conolude that the choice or one p~ttern in 
proforenoe to another is B ohoice between forms of language; end whiohever 
form ot languege is adopted. there w11l be the sape pO$sibilltie. in the in-
r •• ruation that can be oonveyed, and in the influence that oan be exerted.ft50 
Chnp ter XI. Moralists and Pr0p-bandists. simply applies the seoond pattern 
analys18 to a .peeisl 08se. In this cha:t;"ter. Prot. Stevenson e.ttempts to d1 ... 
tlnguilh the different uses of persuDsion end their validity. 
Stevenson follows this ohepter with Sl very interesting one on certain .1' .... 
Iated theoriea. The dieou.slon ot the related theorie8 hel.,s point up more 
olenrly Stevenson', own poa:tion. The analysis or John tGWey reoeives respect-
ful dhoul81on. A basio dirterenoe between Stevenson '. end Dewey·, analysis r 
rests on. the relfltion ot ethios to scionoe. Dewey would make ethics directly 
relAted to and dependent upon eolenoe~ wherePI stevenson would only indireotly 
relate them 8nd keep both of them independent. just as bellet and attitude are 
lnde pit nunt • 
In his disoussion ot Ayer, Russell, Carnap, and 80me others, arter polntin 
out that they too hold an emotive theory of ethioal terminology, Prot. Ste.,.n-
Ion defends them and in lome minor pointe seeks to CDrreet them. Be next di.-
ou •••• Perr.y'. poeition and objeots to Perry's unqualitied identifioation ot 
81 
ethical judgments with plyohologioel statementa about intere.te. "Throughout 
Perr,y" work the analrtl0 and peyoholo~ioAl aspects ot ethics ftre contused with 
the normati.,.e one.--a oontusion which at once diltort. analysis ann hampers 
well-detended e.aluationa. But it is often pOI.ible to separ~te t.he contused 
element. and recombine them. When thh is done, Perry's work affords mAny sug-
ge.tiona, Interesting to 9.r;a.lyets 8.nd praotioal mo"liets aliktr .... S1 
A dl.cu.eion ot G. E. Moor. tollow.. especlftlly in line with the .eoond 
pattern ot analyaie. Prot. Stevenson summari,e. hi. tre~tment thus: 
Almoat all ot tho.e who now elDpba.h~ the emotive as-peete of 9th1.cs 
(inoluding the pre.ent writer) bave at one time been great~ under ~oorets 
influenoe. It 18 not .IlIY to be 11e.,.e that thie is ~ n Il ccident. '1'he pi ra 1-
1.1 bet.en hia v:lew. e. nd the pn •• nt oner-which in 8 p1 te ot aU the 
dittereMe. reJllll1n. surpr1.i~ly 0108 .... -wl11 be evident trom thh obser-
vation. f'nerever Moore would point to a "naturalistio t .. llaoy," the pr .... 
sent writer, throughout the many possible senses wh!§h the 'eo one pattern 
reoognise •• would point to a per.u.sive definition. 
tlvenaon ends the chapter with. conelderatlon of the .thioal po,ition of David 
IiWli.8 •. Stev.naon points out hie Humean t.nd.ncie. when he writ •• that ftot all 
traditional philosopher., lIume ha, mo*t olearly alked the que,tiona that here 
oonoern U8, ana haa moat nearly reaoh.d a oonoluslon that the pr •• ent writer oan 
aooept ... 53 frof. St ..... nson. however, does objeot to Hu.' a empha aidng d18-
agreement in belief but not diaagr ••• nt in attitud •• By negleoting dl.agr.e-
ment in attitud., Stevenaon maintains, Hu .. over_imp11fl •• and overint.lleot~l-
1:&e8 the f rgu:nentll that occur betwe.n people who a re not yet faotua 117 informed, 
61Ibid. p. 271. 
-' 
52Ib~d., pp. 272-273. 
53Ibid., p. 273. 
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and provide. no place for persuasive methods. 54 
Ohapter XIII finds Prot. Stevenson considering some further observations on 
the function of definitions. An understanding of the second pattern requires 
only an understanding of persuasive defini tiona. But they are not always easy to 
recognise nor are their distinguishing characteristics always clear. "There are 
a nuaber ot cases in which persuasive detinitions might be confused ~th per-
auasive atatements of another sort, or with definitions of a more neutral char-
acter. So it will be well to make aome additional distinctions. The reJU.J"ks ot 
this chapter are not indispensable to ethical analysis, but may help to dispel 
misapprehensions, and to throw light on the several use. of language."56 
Stevenson fills out the chapter with considerations of persuasive quasi-detini-
tiona. detached detinitions and their ettect on interests in knowledge, re-
emphatic definition., and legal definitions. Sinoe the additional remarks of 
this chapter are dispensable to ethical analysis, their absence from a summary 
ot Stevensonts ethioal theory will not be missed. 
In the following ehapter Prot. Stevenson considers the problem of freedoa 
in ethical matters under the notions of avoidabili ty and indeterminism. Avoid-
ability and indeterminism are independent of one another. Avoidability is re-
lated to voluntary activity. "In evaluating oonduct people uaually limit their 
judgments to actions wiich they oonsider avoidable, or subject to voluntary con-
54Ibid., pp. 276-216. Stevenson would find objection naturally to Hume 
Bince ~make8 ethics a natural science. Such a view has no place for .tti tudes. 
55Ibid., p. 277. 
ss 
trol.-56 But actioDa subject to voluntary oontrol are not indeterminate actions 
The taot that tt'A's aotion _. avoidable' 11 by DO mean. 8yno~ou. with lA's 
aotion .pra~ from an indeterm1ned choice •• tt57 Prof. 8t ..... n.on oontinue. with a 
diseus.ion of the tree wl11 dootrine in .thica. aa.erting that muoh contusion 
oould b. avoid.d it the proper distinction. were maintained between avoidabllity 
and indet.rainbll. Be oonfe.se. that ttour study of avoidabll1ty has introduo.d 
little novelty lnto the present aDalys!. of ethioa.-S8 
The final ohapter oonllders some praotioal implioations. Th •• e nduoe thea-
lelvel basioal~ to "the proper pbaoe ot loienoe in ethios."59 If 101enoe deals 
with beUet. end ethlos with attitude •• the question arbe. as to the _y in 
whioh they are releted. The important taot whioh Stevenson oontinually .tr ••••• 
throughout the whole book is that ethio. i. not reduoible to loienoe. 
Baving presented .Jery brietly and in outline form the bade teaohing ot 
!Ethios ~ Language, ohapter by ohapter, .. e oan pre.ent now a more oompact and 
syst_tiled IU_ry. Like A.. J. Ayer, Prot. Stevenlon transter. all the tao-
[tual statements of ethio. to the social soientbt. and relegate. all the norma-
[tlve expre •• iona of ethiol to the limbo of emotive utteranoes. But anlike Ayer. 
~teven.on extend. hil ethioal inquiry t () lno lude an e .. ination of the role of 
~tive expre.sions in ethioal dispute •• ne betin. by pointing out that ethioal 
56Ibid. 
-' 
p. 298. 
57Ibld., p. 299. 
58Ibid., p. 30S. (;:0: ~'~~.,~ 
'<,/ f_OY:j" \, \ 
59Ibid., 
\ 
p. 319. I 
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argument. involve both taotual and evaluatift element .. Although there 18 • 
ooaplex interplay of beUefa and attltud .. " ethioal disagreement is primarily a 
matter ot d1811gr.emer:t .!! attitude, and .eaoMar11y of nhaveement .!!! belief. 
R~e approaoh to the subjeot ot ethioal disagr.ement tb:ee ite.lt on the met'hod 
of r •• olYing ethioal dispute. by reoognising the difterenoe between di.~&reemen 
in belief and d1aagre.:ent ill .ttltude and by pointing to disagreement in at-
titude .a the dietlD&uhhlng feature of etlloal disagreement. 
Prot. stevenson enlarges upon th1a thesis that ethioal diaagreeli:enta are 
.hietly _tters of attitude by showlng two .Y8 in whioh they funotion in actua 
.1tu~tlona. Firat, oonflioting attitude. determine what diaagreamenta in belief 
are relevant to an argument, and "oondly. thoy determine whether or not the 
arr;ument hae been .. ttl.d. 
Stevenson is a poaltivlst. Thus he ehares the view that nOl'JlWtlve ethios 
oal.not be a 801enoe. But at the .. me time he recognizee norativo ethloa aa 8. 
vital huaan aotivity. in eioh .01et1Oe oan--in favorable ciroumatanee.-oontrl 
ute _te:rlally to the re.'lution of .thioal (att1tudiDll) disagreement •• As a 
hulen activity. ethio. baa 1ta 0Wt1 ohtilrecterhtio function. ~nd methode tor the 
treatment of moral 1nue., i.e., issue. 1nY~)lY1r.g -personal find 800i",1 deo1l1on 
about What is to be approYed.- To sum up. ethios is not l*.elt a eolenoe, thoug 
.oienoe _y be of .jor irportf.'nce in the re.olutlcm of ethioal p1"Oblema.60 
In this framework tit the nature and funotion of emotive .. aning and per-
eual1ve definitions. The pitterna ot analyeie and their _thode pre.ent typee 
of explanation for 8lItotlvoly laden terma f'nd perau •• ive definition. end the 
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.y they can be used to re.olve ethioal disputes. These. tl:en. constitute the 
very e •• ence of Prot. Stevenlon'. ethical theory. 
Thul tar we have considered the man. his milieu. and his influenoe on hi' 
milieu. We have presented in summery form the basic struoture of Prot. Steven-
.on's meta-ethical theory. In the tollowing ohapter we shall discuss the oore 
188ue of this theory. 
CP""'.PTER III 
THE CORE ISSUE 
This chapter, trans _ tionlll insotl r a. it links Prof. Stevenson f 8 theory 
with an evaluaticn of it, oovers four points. Firat, the purpoee ot the chapter 
is shown. Next, the high points ot Stevenson t • theory are presented in order 
better to understand the underlying problem. Thi. leads into a pre.entation ot 
the core problem itselt. F'lne.lly, conolulSione are drawn. 
Having come to know prof. stevenson a. a philosopher and hi. philolophical 
environment, and having considered in a brief and summary for& hil ethical 
theory, we mIt now slalyze his theory in 8n attempt to unearth hnd pL'esent the 
core is.ue or problem with whioh Prot. Stevenson conoerna hlmaelt. There are at 
leaet two r,,801'1l tor e pre.entation of the oore i.Due. first to make Prof. 
SteTenaon'a ethioal theory manifestly olear. end seoondly to evaluate properly 
the solution that he otters in reeponse to the besio problema 
The summary as presented in the laat ohapter must of. ita very 1'l8ture bit 
inadequate. It does not investigate the theory in order to bring to light the 
a 88uwtiona, presuppositions, bias, or covert problema that rest hidden at the 
heart of the theory. In order, therefore, to IJjlke Steven.on's thA1tory lucid. 
the uriderlying, core problem need. to be understood. 
The core illue with Which Prot. Stevenson oonoern8 himself a180 needs 
36 
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oaretul presentation it his resolution ot th&t issue i8 to be properly evaluated 
The evaluation must de:Jend upon an intrinsio oriticism ot the theory. But such 
an intrinsio otiticism obviously demands a thorough knowledge ot the intrinsic 
structure and content ot the theory. Prot. stevenson proposes to nn8wer n ppob-
10m. That problem manitests itself on different levels. On the first andrr~8t 
manifest level Steven.on presents the problem as one of clArifioation of terms 
and oharaoterisation ot the methods of resolving ethical disagreement. l Ye~ 
deeper left .. exist and with them more _do problems. steveneonts ansyer to the 
problem of the oontusion that exists in ethioal terminology rest. on his analyti 
oal method of clarifying terl!l8. But a more bade problem ariees in the question. 
~t 1s it in ethical terma that lends them to be oontused and to need olar1t1-
cation in the first place'" rhus to evaluate Prot. Steven.on's theory properly 
and fairly ~ core i.lue must be presented. 
A method ot arriving at the eore ls8ue of any Iyste. is to gra.p the high 
pOinte of the .,.te •• These high points should alr.ady be tairly obvious, but 
they will appear a little olearer in this ohapter. Onoe the.e high point. and 
their 8ienitieanee are gra.ped, an analysia ot th«m will lead to the core 1 •• ue. 
In sUDlIary torm the high point. oan be pi ired off into interpersonal-per,oll 
a1. dl.agreement-agre.ment, attltude-bellet, emotlve-d •• eriptlTe meanings, 
ethie.-.olenoe. A full understanding demand. a oonsideration ot eaoh of the.e. 
In all Prot. Stevensonts writings except one the interperlonal proble .. ot 
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ethic. are Itrealledl> 2 Fe doe. this partly tor pragmatic reasons.. Be point. out 
that It 10 • 11 there 18 a. oony.nlene. in looking chiefly to the interperlonal prob-
le .. , where the use ot terma and method. 11 melt oberly \lvidenoed.. w3 Beaide. 
convenience. there 11 aleo a necessity in looking ohiefly to the lnterpermonal 
problema 81nee di.regard ot .ueh probl ... undercut. Stevenlon', notion ot the 
chier concern of ethics. that 18. the oonfllot, the dieagr.ement and agreement 
in ethics. SteTenlon or1tioi'" Nowll-Smith for tailing to oon,ider t.nter~,... 
80ra 1 problema.4. Where better .bdy dhegre.ment and agreement? 
The lnterper,oftlll probl .. 8, hO'OTer, a. hs. already been pointed out, par-
allel the perlonal problema~5 In a pe~lonal deelalon about an ethioal issue. 
man i. trying to make up hla mnd 1Ihellher to approve or dlaapproveof lo_thing. 
So long aa he 11 ethically undeolded. whi. attltude. are in a peyohol.,1cal .tat_ 
ot oonfliot, halt of him approves ot a oert.in objeot or ad.lon. and the other 
halt of h~ dl.approv., ot 1t.-6 !hu •• the ingredients that .ak. up an 1at.~ 
personal ai.atioa pr .. ent th .... lft. in .. per.onalproblelll, a duality ot oon-
tllot~ Thea. ingredient. poiat the way to the oore problem tor whioh .. are 
.earohlDg_ 
The be,10 ingredients ot any ethioal Situation, theretore, are a oertain 
4uality and a oontllot until this duality 1, made a unity_ fhi. op.ns tho way 
ISe.-•• Bmotive Coneep-ti8n ot Ethioa" tor. tr •• 1Iment ot penonal problem. 
!P:t. pio 2. 
-
'oharle. L. St8ve1'llon. "thio. by FilB. lioweU ... SIli:bh .. ft Hi.d. LXIV (July 
1966 h plt 4.01. 
I.'. p~ 2"1 or thl. work. 
-Th. Kmotive I'. '~ion of. Ethio' • • ." DD. 291-292. 
tor another high point of SteTenaon's theory, ethioal agreement and d18agreement~ 
-when ethioal ilsue. beoome oontroversial, they involve diaagreement that ill ot 
a dual nature. There ia almost inevitably disagreement in belief, which requires 
detailed, sensitive attentionJ but there is allO dila~reement in ettitude."7 
Just as disagreement and agreement is more basio than interper.ona 1 and per,on-
1.1, so it i. also more Casic than either emotive or desoriptive meaning. Steven-
Bon!;< .• tates that his tt ••• m.ethodoiogioal oonolusions oenter less on my ooncep-
tion of meaning then on my oonception ot agreement and diaagreement."S An exam-
ination of Stevenson'. oonoeption ot agreement and disagreement ~ll bring u. 
ololer to the core issue and make an evaluation of his theory easier. 
stevenaon realizes that there are disagreen:entll and disag,reementa. He is 
intere.ted in ethioal ItBagreement, and ther.tore, must sort out the ethioal 
tram the Icientitic. He oen make 88ch a distinotion by introduoing the notion. 
ot beUef end attitude into his diacu.e1on. Obviously there can be agreement in 
belief. "Ethioal agreement, however, requires more than agreement in beliefJ it 
9 
requires a~reement in attitude." Stevenllon goes on to shOW, therefore, that be-
aide. agreement in belief there al.o may be agreement in Attitude. Cleerly, 
then, no separation ot one from the other is nece.sarily entailed. 
7~. ,.11 
8Charle. L. Stevenson, "Meaning: Desoriptive and Emotive." The Philoaoph-
~ Review, LVII (March 1948). p. 142. ---
9EL. p. 31. To be more oorreat, Prof. SteT.neon doe. not arbitrarily intra-
~uce the notions of belier and attitude into hi. dlecQ8.ion. He te.la that the 
~ta of ordinary ethioa 1 language when analyzed ofter egreement in belief and 
~greement in attitude. Hia 8oa~als points out that it 1. the distinction be-
~ween agreement in beliet And in attitude that distinguishe •• cience trom 
~thlc8. 
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Although the controversial aspects 01' ethies ~prlng trrtn (US"free[,ent 
in attitude • • • they rerely if ever spring trom thlskind ofdla-
agreement alone. Beliets are the guide. to attitudes; hence the 
isauea that arise in establishing and testing them. or in giving 
them a practioal orr,anhation, retain e vitRl plf><ce thrl)ug'hout all 
normative discourse. It we are to understand the baaic nature 01' 
ethical problema. and thus to economize the enert.:ies that are c~rected 
to resolving them, we must ever be aenlitlve to the dual nature 01' 
ethical tt.1sagreement. Attitude. flnd beUers l)ot.:': plf\v their p~rt, 
and muat be stUdied in their intimate relationship.10 
Tne distinction between agreement in attitude end in beUet parallels the 
distinction ~teven8on tinds when dealing with the meaning of ethical terms. He 
distinguishes meaning into emotive and desoriptive. Emotive meanir~g charaoter-
iae8 ethioal terms and is the t~.i8 tor the possibility of agreement or dia-
agreement in attitude. Descriptive meaning characterizes taotual terms. There-
fore, just al belief' and attitude oannot be separated if the total picture of 
an ethioal problem i. to appear. neither oan emotive and descriptive meaning.ll 
Another distinction logioally follow •• Prof. Stevenlon proc •• d. to di.tin-
guish ethics end science. Soience deals with descriptive meanings and any dia· 
agreement which may ari.e i. disagreement in belief. The di.ar,reement in ethics. 
however. 11 diaagreerient in attitude. Stevenlon takes pa in. to Ihow that ethios 
i. not a branch of any aoienoe, beoause the di.agreement or agree~~nt in ethios 
11 not e.buaye in beUer .. whereas agreement or diaagreeItent in Icience a1_y. 
1s.12 Thus the di.tinction between ethics and loience logioally followse Even 
lOlbid., pp. Id-19. 
llAt first appearance emotive meaning seeu~ the center of Stevenson's sys-
tem, (as '-1 pointed out on page 9, Stevenaon'e doctoral dissertation dealt 
with the emotive meaning of ethioal terJJl8) but his theory. however, hae evolved 
ae is clear tram Aiken' 8 ob.ervation that Stevenson's Imoti ve theory 18 more 
develird as pre.ented in Ethio. ~ Language. 
"Ti'T n H).,. f" 
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at this level. Prof. Stevenson affirma the intimate conneotion of the two. An 
ethioal judgment must often u.e the supporting reasons gained from Icienoe. The 
parallel, therefore, runs through di .. greement-agreement. attitude-belief. 
emotive meaning-desoriptive meaning, ethi08-eoienoe. 
This parallel. running through Prof. Stevenson's theory, gives us the high 
points of that theory. Certain oonclusions oan now follow. Th. basio conclusion 
maintain. that the conn.ratone of Prof. Stevenson's position rest. no* on the 
stress plaoed on interpersonal problema nor on the distinotion betwe.n diaagre~ 
ment and agreement. It reats on a more fundamental distinction. a distinotion 
that makel agreement and disagreement in ethioal matters possible. It rests on 
the distinction between beliefs and attitude •• 
Stevenson's treatment of meaning and its divilion into desoriptive and 
emotive (Wh.ther or not the emotive meaning be dependent, quasi-dependent. or 
independent) circles around thls distinction. The persuasive definitions of the 
.eoond pattern presuppose this division of meaning And the distinction of be-
liefs and attitudes. Needless to say. ethics is differentiated from selence be-
oause of this di.tinction between beUefs snd attitudes. Beoauae St'~ven.ont8 
analysis of the human linguistio situation reveals belief. and attitude., the 
dlatinotiona already eaumerated immediately follaw. 
Beoause of the importanoe of attitude and belief, the need of a more oare-
ful study of them 1s evident. What is an attitude? Disagreement in attitude 1. 
basioally It ••• an opposition of purpo •••• aspiration •• want., preference •• 
de. ire., and so on • • • • The disagreement spring. more from diverfent prefer-
42 
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enoe. than from divergent belieta." The conoept ot attitude 010se1y allies 
it.elt to that ot emotive meaning. "The emotive meaning of • word 18 a tendenoy 
of a word, arising throu£h the history of ita usage. to produoe (result trom) 
attective responses in people.H14 Thus the oonnection between emotive meaning 
and attitude. is obviou •• Emotive meaning hee e. tendency to produce aftective 
respon.es, i. e., attitudes in people .. An attitude could be detined, thentore, 
as any and every aftective response such as an aspiration, fl _nt, a preferenoe, 
a deSire, end the like. It is important to not. that attitudes like amotige 
meaning are dynamio and tend to aotivity. Their existence affects the pr~ctioal 
sphere of human living. 
What 18 a belief? BeUet is olosely allied to d'.lIscriptive meaning. Steven-
son ha_ pointed out that tI .... when judpent. ax'e used pprely descriptively, 
the only disagreement that oan ari.e 10 disagreement in belief."IS There ia • 
oau.~l (or .a Stevenson would preter, a di.positional) relationship between 
descriptive meaning and beliers. aeliera deal with matters of tect. For that 
16 
reason they deel with lloJ'lD!ll log10 flnd induction. A belier is cognitive. i.e. 
it designate. Iuch speoifio kinds of mental activity as " ••• belleving, 
thinking, supposing, presuming. and 80 on.,,17 It is importe.nt to note that be-
liefs as oognitive and dependeat on desoriptive meaning are pal,ive rather than 
13Ib~~." p. 3. 
14"The Emotive Meaning or Ethical Terms." p. 23. 
16Ibid., p. 27. 
l6~, pp. 113-114. 
17 Ibid. • I), 62. 
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active. They look to the speculative side of hunanexiltence. 
The oore problem now remains to be urearthed. The distinction between et-
titude p.nd belier answers the basie problem whioh bothers Stevenson. Raving the 
an ... r we must move backlmrd to the problem it.elf. What is the problem? That 
is the question that naw occupies us. 
ltbe.t is Prof. Stevenson trying to explain when he otters hie distinction 
between beltef and attitude? Obviously he ttle. to explain the difterenee be-
tween a tMtual statement (8 metter ot flllct) and an ethical statement. The oore 
problem, therefore, might be stated! 1) What 11 the ditterenoe betwee.n- 8itaetua) 
stetement and an ethioal statement? or 2) Haw explain the ditterence between a 
taotual statement and an ethical statement? Prot. Stevenson implies that he i. 
denling with this problelll when he states that "the prooelll8 of _king an ethio .. l 
deoision is something JIlOI'e, ot course, thall the prooess 01' tormulatilll faotual 
beliets; but that is simply beo~use rea.ona, in aedition to their oognitive 
nature, have oonativ ..... treotive etfe·ot •• An ethical deoidoD requires a full or 
pertia! resolution of conflict, and no set of beliefa oan be identified with 
tllit!l, hl)W8ver lliuoh it trfly oo~tibute to it."lS 
The same type of problem underlies much of the ethioal writing ot David 
Hume. Nor must Huma'. intluence on the modern Icene be over looked. If, from 
"\ 
the philosophical tradition that extends from the ancient Greek' through the 
last oentury, 8. se leotion were made ot a single thinker predomiJlllntly lntluen-
tie.l on current philosophio thought, next to Descartes, David Hume, the e1gh-
teenth-eentury ,eotsman .. would probably have the strongest ala im. tt}fo~ than 
18 Ibid •• p. 133. 
anY' other person of the pa et, Hume established the spirit end pf'. tterIl of ph 11 0-
S ophloa.l ane.lye1s. Indeed. IJ. philosopher 8S eminent !tlS Bertrand Ruuell 811.1'. 
quite expt'cltly that 80 neerly 1I8.s Rume on the right treek thet one oannot do 
better than to follow hi. lead and oarry along further in the same direotion.ft19 
Thus the poas1biUty of a link between Rumets problem and that lIhich oocupies 
Steveneon exi.t, ~nd is a reality when Ruma's problem and Stevenson's are shown 
to be bastoally the _me. 
It must be noted thet although flume offers a difterent .olution, the proh-
lem he attempts to an.wr 1s the _me as steY.nson's. flume off_red e. different 
solution beoaute of ~,t he attempted. The subtItle ot BUme's A !reatise ot 
- -
HUnan Nature 18 "Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental .Method ot Rea-
soning into MOre.l Subjeot •• - In attempting to introduoe the experimental method 
into ethical prable., Hu_ Itruotured the .olution to his problem. lie _~ 
ethios a part of soience. 
!hie otters at least one reAson ...nv the positivists are linked to HUM. At 
~:me time the poa1tiytst. held a theory of me«nlng whoa. main component wa. the 
~o-called "veritication prlnoiple.- Aocording to this principle, for a synthetio 
(non-tautologous) proposition to be cognitively meaningtul l it must be capable 
in prinoiple of being veritied (or contir..ed) ~ an appeal to empirical evidence 
'hrough u.e ot the verifioation prinoiple the 10gloal p.sltlvl.tl hoped to I1mlt 
~he area ot co&nltlve __ nl~tulneS8 to subjecta that can be dealt with by the 
jathodology ot the _plrioal lolenoe .. 20 Like Bu .. they _Ilted to introduce the 
190ontaporary Phl1oloplg. p. 6. 
2°011 ver A. Johnion" Rthioa (New York. 1958). I). 466 tt. 
experimental methods of rea80ning into ethioal questions. 
AS is evident from the fir.t chapter, Stevenaon 18 in the po.itiviat trad.-
ition. :Jin08 be iii in that~radition, the problem <e) that be will attempt to 
a118lNr will be those o:f the positivists. Th.is, of COUI"S8, d008 not li.m1t Prof. 
stevenaon'. solution to that of the poeitiviats. he would n(.)t agrefl with tll.e. 
when they oOt~olud. that because ethioftl propo.itiona fail to ti&tiafy the orite1"-
ion of ve.t"U'ie.b111ty, they Bl8t be p • .,udo-propolition., devoid of 00g1'.l.1t1 .. 
aignifioanoe. St.veneon would not agree with Ayer when he writee that "we begia 
by admittl~ that the fundamental ethioal oonoepts are \;41.na1y.ab18, ia'.lI\loh 
.s there i. no oriterion by whioh one oan test the vaUdi ty of the judgment. in 
whioh they ocour •••• i~e .ay that the reason 1I'b¥ th~ .. re u1ll.mlyaabl. ia 
21 that they are mere pseudo-conc.pt •• ft ieGauae Steveuon bas found another ana-
WI' to bas10ally the __ problG, he doe. Aot agr •• with AyeI'. Stevenson'a ana-
wer re.te on the diatiaotlon between attitude and beliet, emotive maanLag and 
de.oriptlve meaning. An ethioal tena is not oompletely al3llly.able into deeorip"" 
the _aning, beoause emotive lItI&ning i8 pre.ent. The 1JIi.pGrtant faot that nee', 
notice 18 that the problem .1 found in ~ or in the positiYiat, or in SteveD'" 
In order more olearly to underataad the problem, a br1af ooneideration of 
it a' tound 1n Bwae ia need.d. A JDOral problem for HUM 1_ one whioh deale with 
our aotion. and alfeotiona. Suoh .. conoeption haa many raadtloa.tiona. Since 
morals have an 1nfluenoe OD aotions and at'reotlona, it to llowa that •••• they 
oannot be derived trom !'ea80D. and that becauae realon done. a8 ... have a1-
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k-eady pro .... d, can never have any such influence. Morals excite passiona, and 
produce or prevent actions. :aeason ot itself' is utterly impotent 'n this partio-
22 ~lar. The rules of morality" therefore, are not conclusions of our reason. It 
Thus we notioe that llum.e makes a distinction between reason and passion. 
~ea8on, according to Hume, is the faoulty of understanding and knowledge. But 
nowledge is one thing, to be moved by that knowledge to act is something else. 
~t is erroneous to attr1bute to reason the motivating power which belongs to 
~ther faoulties. 23 As Hume himself .ays in his Treatise. "ReaBon is wholly in-
.ctive, and oan never be a .ource of so aotive a principle as oonsoienoe, or a 
sense ofmorals.u24 In ~Enquiry Conoerning ~ Prinoiples ~Morals Hume 
points out that "reason being cool and disengaged is no motive to aotion, and 
directs only the impulse reoei ved from appetite or ino11nation, by showing us 
the means'ot attaining happiness or avoiding misery.n 25 
Prom what has been said thus tar, the passions are clearly the dynamio as-
pect or moral jud~nta. They alone are the "springs of action." Hume maintains 
Iiliat passion, It ••• as 110 gives pleasure or pain, and thereby oonstitutes hap pi-
ness or misery" become. a motive to action and is the first spring to impulse, 
~o desire and vo11t10n. u26 The passions are the aotive prinoiple of ohoioe. 
22David Ifume" Hume t s Moral and PeU tical Philosophy, ed Henry D. Aiken 
(New York, 1948),p. 33. 
2~umets conception of reason as passive follows in the Lookean tradition. 
2"Hume, p. 34. 
251b1d., p. 269. 
-
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Although both are working on diff.rent levela, Hume on the psychologioal, 
st.venson on the linguistio aDd logioal. it 1s olear that reason end passion 
in Huze's Iystem are similar to b.li.f and attitude in Steveson' •• For this 
rea.on and in this framework St.venson oan writ. that ft ••• morel judgment. go 
beyond cognition, speaking to the conative-aff.ctive nature of m.n.,,27 
Prof. St.venson's problem, th.refor., is muoh like Hume's. Both wiah to 
know the diff.reno. b.tween mett.r. of tact and .tt.rs of action, b.t.en 'Is' 
and 'Ought.' This problem deals not with the diff.reno. between the two, but 
the transit trom the one to the bther. H~ move from 'Is' to 'Ought,' from faot. 
to aotions? Rume hal his solution, a solution whioh needs ao .luoidation at this 
tim •• stevenson has his solution. This solution does need presentation. 
Stevenson first anawera n.gatively and .tates what the tran.lt from an tIs' 
to an 'Ought,' from a factual judgment to an ethioal judgm.nt 18 not. It i8 not 
an induotive leap beoaus., as St.v.neon points out, ft ••• the .mpttloal facts 
are not inductive crounds from whioh the ethioal judgment proble.tioally foli 
10wa."28 The rea. on for1thi. li •• in the fact that .thioal deoi.ions or evalua-
tiona are .motive or attitudinal. They .y b. r.lated to knowledge aa .fteot. to 
otiu.es, but not a. logioal oonoluslona to pr.mi •••• 29 Moreover, ethioal prabl ... 
extend beyond formal logio and induotion. Aa Stev.n.on obs.rve., .thios, 
27.!!!. p. 13. 
28th• EIIoti TO Meaning 2!. Ethioa 1 Terma. p. 29. 
" ••• 
29S1dney Zink, "Xethodologioal Guidanoe and Ethical Detaohment," .!!!.~­
olo~hloal Review, LXI (April 1962), p. 226. 
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to wtatever extent it' proble .. extend beyond at;r ... ent end diaagreement in be-
Uet, _y involve .thod, that extend .~ tor .. l 1ogio and induction.-30 
A. we ha."e .een in the last ohepter (pp. 23-24), tor_l logic provide. ccndi-
tiona tor the rational acoeptanoe ot ethioal judpaentl, -but not .uttiolent 
one" - beoau.e ethioal judgmentl inolude lomethlng more than de,criptiTe meanmg 
and beliet. 31 
Prot. steveneon next oonliders the problem more po.itively_ Along With the 
other proponent. ot the e.tive theory ot ethical d1acour.e, .,.intainl that 
an ethical .tatement, trom a logical point ot view, 11 not delcrlptlve, but a 
concealed imperative. Now it ie logiaall.y tapo"ible to derive an imp •• tive 
trom .~ let ot .entenoes allot which are in the indioa.tlve mood and none ot 
whioh oontain even a oonoealed imperative. Thus it 11 evident that there must 
al .... ya be 80me moral imperatiye which is not reduoible to, or oannot be trans-
Iated into, oognitiftly veritiable, desoriptive ltatements. Ethical judgments 
always contain an imperative component whioh 18 ,aid to benon-cognitlft in the 
lenae ot being unverifiable aooording to pUblic empirioal e."idenoe in oonjunc-
32 
tion with the lan ot logio. In SUll, what the no-ought-trom-an-18 dootrine 
a,sertl i8 that " ••• no value judgment can be deduced trom a s.t ot purely 
tactual ,tat.mentll more general~ still, that no value judgment can be deduced 
~, pp. 113-114. 
81Ib1d., p. 135. 
-
82For the Emotive Theory'. oonneotion with empirioism and derivation trom 
~ertain major souroe. see Hans Meyerhott, "Emotive and Exiltentialist Theories 
ot Ethios," The Journal ot Philosophy, XLVIII (December 6, 1951). 
from a •• t of premia •• 'Whioh do •• l'1ot oontain .. value jud.gment. tt33 Prof. at ..... 1l-
Ion, th ... tor., .olve. the problem by p.sserttngl ttEthioal etatemente bave a 
at 
meaning tbat 18 approximately. and in part, tapent1ve." Beoau.e of thh an 
1mpen:blft oonolu.10n can be logioa 11,. interred from .thioal _.t.Nnt •• 
Suoh a .';)l1\ttont.'.not new with st ..... naon. G. E. Koore taokled the -_ 
problem and offered a 801ut10n 80BMthat .1J:;11ar to 8t ..... 11I0Zl· •• exoept for 
1I00re an imperative 1& uDlu_17able. Let UI ooul4er :NoGre'. pNltton a 11ttle 
more in detail. Moore agr ... that eth10, 11 oOllOerned with the que.tloa of 'llbat 
good. oduot 11' "but. being oOMeme4 with thi •• 1t ob'f'iou81,. doe. not .tart 
at the MC1nn1ng, unl •• e 1t 1, prepared to tell u. what i. good a .... 11 a. what 
Sf> il conduct." 8iuee conduot 18 in 'QDt .ay or other the outoome of the moving 
toroe of an impel"tltl ..... the lmpentlv. 18 not 0011O_1ed in the donduet. It then 
1, a oonoee.le4 imperativ., 1t •• t be 1n tbe 'go04'. VeO", tb.r.fo~, glve. till 
•• 1,.11 of 'good'. 1n whioh he oODClud •• that 'gooci' 18 undefir.bl •• "Or 1t I 
am alk.d '!ow 1. good to 'be denned" JI9' &r.wwer 1. that it oalUlot be deli_d, 
and that I, all I ha .... to .. y about 1t.,,36 In oth.r warde, an l~.ti .... aa 
imperatiY. oannot be equated w~tb a.~ .. :bural propeMq'. Thu8, it cannot stand 
the t •• t ot .... ritbb1l1ty. It 11 at thl. point that Moore introduoe. his natur-
alist10 tallaoy.3? 
$~4t;F. I..t1£i:n80n" A. C. )lontefiore. ·'Ought· aDd tI"'" Philosophy. 
XXXIII (January 1958). p. 30. 
,''!'-. , 
~L. p. 26. 
" '"'!!' . . 
3~~rinolpla EthloQ. p. 2. 
:56 "I.-. '. <. ..' ;. Md.; p. 6. 
S'T~ •• p. 9. 
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In dealing tii th some related theories, Prot. Stevens or. expresses his in-
debtednees to David lIU!lle and G. E. l;!oore. He maintains that 01' all traditional 
philosophers. Hume considered the same problems ft ••• that here concern us, 
and has most nearly reached a conclusion that the present writer can accept ... 38 
Stevenson points out his relationship to Moore and Moore t s problems when he con-
resses that "almost all or those who now emphasize the emotive aspects 01' eth1c~ 
(includinta ~ ,eresent writer) have at one time been greatly under Moore's in-
tluence. It is not easy to believe that this is an aCQ~dent. The parallel be. ' 
tween his views and the present ones--wniCl in spite 01' all difterences remains 
surprisingly close--will be evident trom this obeerTation: Wherever Mo~re would 
point to a 'naturalistic ta1lacy', the present writ~r ••• would point to a 
persuasive detinition. R39 
Thus we see that Prof. Stevenson deals with the same problems that Hume 
and Moore dealt with. What distinguishes an empirical statement from an ethioal 
statement? His solution, which is abundantly evident from the preceding, point. 
to difterences in attitudes and beliefs, emotive meaning and descriptive meanillE • 
Stevenson also considers their other problem: HOW' does one move from fls' 
to 'Ought'? The transit is made by means of a concealed imperative. ~he faotual 
statement has a dual linguistio function in ethioal statnments. It has descrip-
tive meaning, but it also oontains emotive meaning. Because the emotive meaning 
18 similar to or involves an imperative, the leap rrom apparently factual pram-
38~, p. 273. 
39Ibid., pp. 272-273. Italios not in the original. 
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hea to an ethical conclusion can be made. Stevenson. the~tore, can a r~Tue 
againat Moore. 'Good' is definable and in terms of fl Datural quality or propeJ'ty 
It 1, defiaabl. in t.rms of emotive meaning. i •••• in terms ot attitudinal pro-
pertiaa. 
Now that we have unearthed and brought to light the oore il.ue that under-
11es Prot. st.venson's theor,y. a brief reau.. ot wbat we have aocomplished will 
gin f\ clearar vi .. of what is lett to uncover in our attempt to tiMer,tane! and 
evaluate properly Prof. stevenlon'. position. In the tirst chapter we introduoed 
Prof. Stevenson and plao ed him in hll philoaophio eaviro.nment. Chaptsr II 'UJr.to> 
mari.ed hh ethical theory. Tha pres.nt ohepter sitted out and analyzed the oore 
i.aus that underlie. and motivate. Prot. Stevenson'l writing •• 
What i, lett to be done1' We have come to grips with SteveMon'lI proble. 
and hie .1Ilution. NoW i8 the time to evaluate both in order to •• e it the prob-
lem really 18 a problem and it the solution really e.nswere the problem. This 
work of' evaluation we ahell attempt to do in the f'olloWing che.pter. 
CHAPTER IV 
AN EVAll1ATION AND CO~~NTS 
In thia chapter we emil try tc e_luate the thecry proposed by Ohatle. L. 
~tevet,son. Such an evaluation, although very briet, will eante14 around steveD-
~ont. theory itselt, e,ttempt1ng to oritioize it intrinsically. Such a oritio1am 
must begin with the problem itselt that Stevenson tries to answer. We ahall 
pre.ent, theretore. the 10[ics1 problem, its n~ture. stevenson'. aolution, and 
our critique. Next, we shall di.cuss the epi8temclogical-payohological problem, 
the distinction between ethics and science, Stevenson's epistemology, end tinal-
ly offer a critici'm and ootaents. 
The problem can be oonsidered logically, epistemologically, or paycholcgi-
pally. We shall ocnsider the logical prable m. One statement of the logioal 
problem reduce. itself to "HoW logio&lly proceed trom 'Ill' to 'Ought'?" Yet a 
~l08.r look points out the more basic problem, What distinguishes an empirical 
pudgant from an ethioal judglnent? More basioally. Stevenson JnU8t answer the 
;ue.tbn (either explicitly or implioitly). Are empirical end ethioel conolu.iont 
Ufterent? 
What ia to be said for thia be.io problem &s a problem? Ie it 8 real prob-
em? Is it valid and susceptible of e. meaningful answer? It is a meaningful 
uestion, e. real find valid problem IU can be seen from the consequenoes, at lea at 
62 
63 
the oon.equer~e that it there i8 nQ difterence between an smpirioal and an 
ethical Itstement, then there is ~o logioal difficulty in moving from 'Is' to 
fOught'. from 8n _pinosl premi •• to an ethioal conolulion. If the re 1, a d't-
terenoe between them, then new problems arise. In either c~le the problem i, 
oapable of a meaningful ~nswer. 
T~e problem 1s valid tor a .eoond reason. at lealt aooording to a oon~OD-
.ense 11~u1atl0 analysis, sinoe an empirical statement does differ ir til an 
ethioal .tatement. The stateril8t\t that "Jellow oceupies suoh a pace 1n the 
spectrum" doe. dUfer fron) the stat..., nt that u,ou ought to ob~ your mother 
and father." Therefore, Stevenson either will Agree with the common-senae an-
alylis or disagree, and thereby be foro.d to ofter proof that the oommOD-sen.e 
analysis is talse. 
Stevenson answers that empirical and ethiCAl atatementa are different. 
While he tells us w~ they are different, stevenson a180 tells us how they d1f-
rer. They differ in at least four way •• 1. An empirioal atatement deal. with 
matters of tect, while an ethical deale with matters of aotion or evaluation. 
2. An e.plrical statement springs trom a un'. beliet., while fln ethical springs 
ultillllltely from a man'. attltu.dea. 3. An ellpirioa 1 statement 18 subjeot to em-
plrleal verif~ab11itYJ an ethioal statement i, not. 4. An empirical statement 
tollow. the la .. of tormal logio and induotion, wherea. an ethioal statement 
doe. not beoause it is basice. 11y emotive and only cognitively meflningtul ltat.-
1 ~nt8 can tollow the laws ot formal logio and induotion. r:-:-.*"','"''''' ... ,---.~ ..........., 
IThe differences between the two type. ot atatements, althou!l1 not expres.-
ed .s such b.Y Steven.on in Ethios and Language, are there implioitly. Chapter II 
1.",11 TTT i:l"i.d i:n nn4ni: i:haln nu+. in na •• 1.n .. 
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A briet critique ot Prot. Stevens~n's answer is demanded. A oonsideration 
of the first difference seems to indicate an oversLr,plitication on Stevenson' 8 
part, an inadequaoy. An empirical statement does detini tely deal with matters 
ot tact. We agree with Prot. Stevenson. We also agree that an ethical statement 
deals with matters ot action and tacts. Because something is tactually such and 
such, theretore, something ought to be done. We tind the tacts expressed in 
reasons. Stevenson readily admits the ;18ce ot reasons in ethical dhcourse, but 
maintains that they differ from the reasons that support an empirioal proposi-
tion.2 Reasons, he maintains, support the ethical statement in the way that 
reasons support imperatives. 
Not everyone would agree with Prof. Ste~n80n's reasoning. Certain authors 
think that more often than not reasons are related to ethical statements logical 
ly and not merely psychologically_ Harrod offers this example. "Do not kill an 
innocent person because that would not be altruistic." The reason, ~oause that 
would not be altruistic," is logically related t:~ the ethioal statement, "do not 
kill an innocent person," as a minor premise to its conllusion. Harrod explains 
the syllogism in this manners 
The major premise of all ethical judgments, general or particular. 
might be expressed as 'one ought to be altruistic', this premise 
constituting a definition of 'ought'. In conjunction with various 
tacts about human (or animal) needs and pains and laws of' nature. 
etc., this premise l~elds a varie~J of' conwlusions, general and 
partioular, containing ~~e word ·ou~ht'. The 'ought' in these con-
oluliona il aooounted tor by the tought' in the major premise. 
Since this is e definition there is no meaning in Rsking why 
ono ought to bo altruiltio.3 
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Aocording to suoh a procedure~ therefore, in some instanco. reesons caD 
imply the ethioal etatement ae conolu.ion. In otr,er words, • partioular ethioal 
stetomont can be deduoed fr:)lIl l\ more universal ethical principle. An e.mple 
which make. uae of a first order moral principle a8 l\ major premise trom whioh 
an ethioal oonclusion tollaws r.ads, "Do good and avoid evil. But this 1s good. 
Thererore do this." The rilljor premise as a tirst order moral prinoiple in-
olude. the impera.tive" "to g()od." '1'he tactual or empirical .tatemont is the 
minor, "fbi. particular thing or aotion i. good." Thus the ethioal and the e~ 
pirical .tateleenta are neooasarily linked. 
The objeotion might be raised that "This is good" is not e taotual or em-
pirica). statement. It the reotual or empiricnl is limited to natural propertie., 
then auoh an objection is valid, and G. E. More 1a oorreot in enurlciating hi. 
naturaliatio faUaoy_ If it is limited to beliet. and "thh ia good" ia leen 
a. essentially a matter of attitudes as steveuaon JdlintQil18, then the objeotiOll 
ia again valid. But if the empirioal or taotual 1. not limited dlreot~ to 
natural properties and it. although limited to beUet., ftThb i. goodft i. vi ..... 
ed a8 es.entially a matter of belie'., then the objeotion 1s not valid, and an 
ethioal oonolusion can be ird'erred from an ethical JllE'jor and an empirioal minor. 
There should follow an analysis of "This i. good," deri:onstreting that it 11 
reduoible to beliers, but that would take u. too rar afield. This, however, is 
3hoy Forbes narrod, Foundatioll.aot Inductive Logic (New York, 1966L pp. 
271-272. 
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the pOint ot disagreem.nt. A .... proceed .... shall show that the reduotion ot 
'good' •••• nt1elly t(\ attitudes it'! unt.n~.ble and b$1d8 to e);e.ggort>tod c.:lla&"' 
queM.s. !bue, although the problem will still IItand unsolved. at least we 8bt11 
know that Prot. stevon.on'. solution h Ilot entirely se.t1atactory or fl-.deque.te. 
Although the qu •• tion of whet~er or not nTh1e 1. good" ie an e&p1rioal or 
an ethloal •• t ... nt JOe_ins open •• till the logleel relatedness of empirio •. l 
and ethl.a1 atatemeats baa not been di'proved. athio. r~e.uppo8'. experienoe and 
tor thll re.aon .. pir!.,.l .tlltec·.cta cftn be related to ethioal .tatem_nt. indue-
th'81y_ By a desoription e.nd en ane 1y.1I ot hlJ1IIU'l nature. the cth10ian proceeds 
induntl.ely to a certftin general proposition or prinoiple fro~ whioh an ethioal 
aystem oen be deduoed. It 1s ~l.o by retlection on one'. experienoe th8t the 
t1rlt order mo".lp .. ineipl.s become explioit. Although this doe. not eome about 
~gh induotlon. it does point out that .thios doee presuppo •• exper1~noe. tbe 
ellG'"lrioal. For this ""8on, the htthod ':)t ethic!! is not purely inductive flor 
deduotive. but a oombination ot the two. It is ompirioo-deductive in ohal~oter. 
thus. while auoh Q Iftttthod realhea tr.e differenee between ell 8mpirioal .tatement 
and an ethical 8tatement. it does not Itress the difterence and sttive to 100-
late the statemelltll rather it ,treas"l the re18tedn8l18 of the statementa and 
atrl.e. to paintont their JIlUtual oooperation. 
This i. the polnt at whioh we d10.g,..e with St •• enl!lon's al1&ly.18. He oyer-
str ••••• the dltte .. enoo between the ethioal aad the ... pirie_l. It do •• not s.e. 
jUltltled to _intllin, •• stevenson doee. that the ethic".l is tho ethic.l and 
the empirioal the eJnp1r1.oel and never the twain aha 11 JDtlt.t. 
'Ih9:t 1s ateveneon'. baai. tor str.ssing thie dittereaoe? An .. nI .... r to thia 
QutstioD will point out. t!I little JlIt)re olearly. the general tende"cy in Steven-
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son to s'treu differences. By stressing differenoes, he runs the risk of intro-
ducing a basic duality into his ethical theory. This can be exemplified by con-
sidering the distinction betw.en an ethioal statement and an empirical statement 
The foundation for the distinction between an ethical statement and an empirical 
statement is twofold. the difference between emotive and descriptive meaning and 
between beliets and attitudes. 
We Shall disouss first emotive and descriptive meaning. Meaning tor Prof. 
Stevenson, at least 1n ethical discourse, is of two types, emotive and descrip-
tive. Charnel" Perry raises the question, aAre these the only types ot meaning 
relevant to ethical discourse'· It would seem that such a division 1s not ex-
haustive. This classification is based on an analysis of a term's ~. Steven-
80n finds that in ethical situations, language is used in two ways, descriptive-
ly and emotively. Thus he puts forth this classification. Yet another type of 
analysis, for example, an analyais 1n terms of the method of verification, could 
lead to a difterent ol ... lfioatlon, ~ meauing and function meaning for example 
A problem immediately *rises of determining which method or what method ot 
classification is valid and adequate. Is Stevenson t s method, the description 
and analysis of how ethical terms are used, valid in explaining what meaning is? 
he method seems to be invalidbecause it deals with the .!!!l language is used 
nd not with the meaning of language. The method oorrectly leads to the conclu-
sion that in an ethical d tuation there is language that is used descriptively 
nd language that is used emotively. the method, however, really tells nothing 
bout the mea Ding of ethical discourse, but rather about the language in 1dlich 
• meaning, the very heart and soul, pulse and lite of ethical discourse 
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11 clothed. 
If Prof. Stevenson would urge thst this method doe. deal with the meaning 
of ethioal terma, then the method would be inadequate becau.e it .eem. to vio-
late the interiority and subjectivity ot meaning Elnd tails to graap the taot t 
~h&t meaning has an inside as well as an outside. This point we shall treat at 
~r .. ter length when we come to dilcU88 Prot. Stevenaon's theory ot meaning_ But 
~he inadequacy of the method 1s shown when beside. descriptive end emot1ve, the 
~ethod al.o otters "expressive" meaning. 
If we follow SteTenson's lead to it. fullest, we shall find that ethical 
language can be used in at least three way •• desoriptively, emotively, and ex-
IPre881ve~y. La:'1gUAge 1& used descriptively in de.oribing objectively 8.n ethioal 
~ituation, e.g., "If men oommit treason, the.e con.equence. follow." It is used 
emotively 1n emoting .ubjeotively over an ethioal litunt ion. But UangU8 ,e oan 
~lao be used expre.sively in expressing in emotive-cognitive terms the aubjeo-
~1vely grasped objeotive intelligibility of an ethical situation. For e,xample, 
When one men tells another in a non-argumentnti ve way that he clefirly eees that 
~s fait a. he is concerned, to •• U films to a foreign power would be an act of 
"rea.on, and for him treeeon ia wrong, and thus he cannot se~l them, he 18 doing 
something n~ore than objeotively desoribinc an ethioal situation ('inoe he is 
involved in the situation Bnd committed to 8 way of e:,tion, and thus does not 
present the situation in pure objeotivity) or subjectively expte •• lng hi, feel-
ings and attempting to che.nge the hearer'. feelings to conform nth his .ince 
",he ooJmnittment is persona 1 and more then a DJEltter of f.elinge. ::7e ip expreesing 
~n langut'ge at once both cognitive and ellOti.e an objective altuatlol1 whioh ha. 
~enlng for him end in which he 18 personally committed. Thus, the "expreuive" 
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meaning ot ethioal language is the union of desoriptive and emotive meaning. 
A similar criticism arises when Prot. Stevenson's division of attitude and 
beUet is contidered. Ie the distinotion between beUet and attitude valid? Some 
Iwould aintain (Charner Perry for one) that it is not a oomplete diSjunction.4 
others would objeot to his lack of preoision in dealing with belief and attitude 
pointing out thRt Stevenaon ft. • • oontuses attitudes 'of two difterent tevels. ft6 
Henry David Aiken would objeot to the division because, as he sees it, beliet. 
are attitudes. They differ merely in the taot that "beliet. are interested in 
matters ot truth and taliity, other attitude. are not."6 Everett w. Hall orit-
iolles Stevenson'. div1aion trom al1difterent angle. He objeots to Stevenson's 
oontention thAt attitudes have merely causes and etteot •• Hall would want to add 
the notion ot objeote. Attitudes are not blind. They ft ••• do have objects and 
not .erely oause. and efrects, thflt is ••• they are not 81mp~1 behavioural 
taot. but posses. a a.mantical dimenslon. ft7 
We obaerve, therefore, that there is a difference ot opinion over whether 
or not the di.tinotions between attitude a nd belief, em~tive and descriptive 
mear ing, are adequate. If the d tatlnotions are,6.t!iItdequate, the duality that Prot 
Stevenson has built up in the ethioal situation is elso inadeqUAte. There are 
further reeaons for an 1ntl.equaoy. The foundation of these d1etlnction.~ar. 
4Charner Perry, ·Sound Ethios and Confused Language," Ethios, LV (Oot. 
1944), p. 209. Perry believes that such a division is insdequete. 
5Everett w. He. 11, "Stevenson On D1aagreement in Attitude," Ethics, LVIII 
(Oca. 1947), p. 56. 
6Henry David Aiken, "Ethics ~ Lallf;uaf£e," !!!! Journal 2! Philosoph;y, XLII 
(August 16, 1946), p. 461. 
7Everett w. Hall, "Preotlal Reason.," Mind, LXIV (July'1956), p. 320. 
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buried. in Stevenson's epistemology and psychology, or at any rate in his epis-
te.ologioal and psychological presup~ositions. The •• we shall oonsider shortly. 
A few oomments concerning the notion and plaoe of vefifiability in Prof. 
Stevenson's approaoh are needed. Stevenson oorrectly maintains that an empirioal 
statement is empirioally veritiable and th~t an ethical statement qua ethioal 
i8 not. But h. seems to make an illogioal j~~p when he staply assumes that be. 
oause an ethioal statement is not empirically verifiable, neither is it true or 
talse. Perhaps Prot. Stevenson reasoned in this aanner. "If the meaning ot a 
proposition is the method of its verification, and if verifioation haa '0 be in 
terms ot observation ot sensible events, then olearly ethioal propositions oould 
not have meaning in this way •• ,,8 •• For this reason, Prot. Stevenson un-
oovered the emotive meaning of ethioal terms. But he ~ails to establish, at 
least to my satisfaction, the two hypothetioal clauses. It would see. that t:le 
meaning of a proposition goes beyond the method of its verifioation, espeoially 
when the method of verification is so narrQJlly restrioted to the obaervation of 
sensible events. The __ i~ p~int at oritioism, however, rests on the taot that 
Prot. Stevenson seems to aooept as proved assumptions which he does not justify. 
~e aocepts the hypothetioal, at least implioitly, as factual. and then to save 
the meaningfulness of ethioal terms he introduoes emotive meaning. 
At first it might 888m surprising that Prof. SteTeneon aocepts suoh presup-
positions. It we recall, however, his philosophioal environment and upbringing, 
his blind &coeptanoe ot such assumptions is not strange at all. The assumptions 
8Iris Murdoch, "Metaphysios and Ethios," !!! Nature ~ Metaphysics, ode by 
D. F. Pears (London. 1957), p. 101. 
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belong to a oertain epistemolggioal end psyohologioal tramework Which Prot. 
Steven.on acoepts and builds upon. Therefore, to grasp the inadequaoy of his 
superstruoture it is neoeuElry to oonsider Prof. Stevenson's epistemological and 
p.yohological presuppositions. 
Let u. su~rile very briefly our remarks concerning the difference between 
an empirioal and an ethioal statement. We agree with Prof. Stevenaon that to ask 
the differenoe between the twu stf1te.lnenta is a Vfl.l1d and meaningful que,ti::m. Hi 
answer is what we object to. We objeot. not precisely to his answer. but to the 
atreu that he pleee. upon the differenoe betw.en the two types of statetrent. 
In overstres.ing their dirferenoe Prof. Stevenson appears to run the risk of 
viewing the .ouroe of thoae statements as a duality. It seems that he fails to 
talce into acoount that the person who In,,,ke. the empirical atat«!lment il the 8ame 
a. thst which ~ke. the ethioal statement. In his conoern to keep the two type. 
of statements .. para ted. Prof. Stevenson present his theory of _li.t end stti-
tude, very olosely ekin to Hume's reason and paa.ion. in whioh attitudes are 
bUnd. not specified by any object. but limply a metier of stimulus-respons •• 
cou .... eff.ct. 
Suoh Qata might point to an inad.qu~te cono.pt of man ~n Prof. Stevensonts 
part. At any rate. it does point to f\ certain inAdequa.cy in his method of lin-
gui.tio .naly,ia. and for that u.tt.r in linguistio analysis in gen.ral. The 
analyst ooncerns himself with words which flre the outward expression of aments 
interiority. Although the analyst does not stop at the words thems.lves, but 11 
cono.rned with their meaning. that is, with their subjeotivity. his method re-
.tricts him to v1ewi~ m.aning or S;rasping ~A.ning from tb. outside in. The 
method is simile.r to th*t of the behaviorist who studi •• ~n only as an obj.ct. 
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Stevenson studies words in this manner. This is valuable, but suoh a method. runs 
the risk of neglecting the subjectivity ot words, their interiority. 
Sino. words are the verbal expression of man, they are very much a part of 
man, and an analysis ot them as mere objeots ofter. the same consequences a. an 
analysi8 ot man as a mere object otfere. Tr.e pioture that the analyst otter8 i. 
ineOJllplete. 'When man and man t s language are considered merely as objeots, and 
it s .... that this ha. happ.ned 1n SiIev.Mon's theory, the basic unity of man 
disintegrates 1nto a dU8.1ism. 9 
Concerning this dualism and the method at analysis that l.ads to it, we 
agree with Charn.r Perry that Ethios ~ Language has two defects. "The meaning 
of the basic terms used is never .xactly or clearly determined and the correct-
ness and adequacy ot the initial schematism are uncritically assumed."lO 
Stevenson's failure to distinguish between an analysiS of meaning and an anlysi8 
of situation, according to soa., points out the inadequacy of SteTeuon's initia 
8chematism.. Such an inadequacy will show up in his p ... terns cf analysis. ThuB 
Hay sugge8ts that the ~ ••• tailure of this book to make explicit and constant 
distinotion between these two would acoount tor Stevenson's failure to see that 
his pattern will not give a correct analysis of the meaning 'ot certain distinc-
tivelyethical sentences.-ll thus the conclusion is reached that " ••• the 
main fault ot the work is that the analysis is confused and inadequate •• 12 
9See Bernard J. P. Lonergan, S. J., Insight (Bew York, 1951), p. 554. 
l°Perry, p. 209. 
llw. H. Hay, ·C. L. Stevenson and Ethical Analysis,· The Philosophical Re • 
.:!!!!'lLTI (July 1941), p. 430. --
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Prot. Ste .. n80n t , an ... r to the problem ot the ditterenoe between an ethi-
oel and an eapirioal .tatement struoture. the "tran8it" problem. how to moye 
from 'la' to fought'. Hi. underatanding of what make8 a faotual statement and 
what _kef; an evaluative statement predetermines the an .... r. Log1cally apeaJdng. 
an ixrperetive of .olt.e 80rt haa to be present 1n the factual atat •• nt it the 
eonclusion i8 to be imperative. But 8inoe an ethioal term aa ethioal 18 oonsti-
tuted by emoti.,.e mean1ng. thb emot1ve meaning auUIIleS the role ot a qua.i-1m-
peJ"lltbe. necause -This is good" oontains emotive meaning. that 18. a quasi-i ... 
porat;.ve. a oonclusion •• ~.,jll ali "&0 thh" logioally follows. Thus steYeneon ana-
wera the problem. 
Ie the al1ll1Nr adequ'lte' Or rather 13 the problem adeql.late'l 18 it meaningtu 
to ask how one proce.ds from 'la' to :\Ought t , Someone might objeot that Prot. 
Stevenlon i8 asking a more oomplex qu~utionl G1Ten the proposition "!hie it:· 
good." how do I logioally oonolw1. that I pught to do thll? A.n 1mp4JratlYfI doe. 
not appeal" tl.nywbere in the stat&~,j;; excel:il; in the oo.uolu.aion. rhus from a tao-
ttt!'! Btl.t4itment:, 1\'1'his 1s Load." an .thioal atatement ia deduced. Ste .. 1180n _in-
t£1na thf.t in suoh a ca.e en imperative ia preoent but hidden 1n the ethioal 
ter.m 'good l • This hidden imperative Steveneon analy~. out in term. of emotl.-
meaning. 
But 18 8t~ch the ell $e? Doo8 every' good r upon analy.i8 yield an _tlY. 
mellning e.nd thereby a quasi'" itnpel"lltive? If every' good' do ••• then wbate.,..r 1. 
good must be done. Acoording to Stevenaon every I good' lmpUo it 1,. inc lude. an 
imperat!.ft and yet neon. would adaU that in time of war. during a 'battle. a 
soldier ought to go above lind beyond the 0811 of d.uty. Yet everyone adJD1t. that 
such ar:. e.ctiOll is • ood'. 'I'hUfi it vhuld .e8m that Stevenaon f. ana 811 inade-
quatelyexplains the case in which something i8 'good', and yet does not of 
necesei ty 1I1p1y an ought. 
In those other cases in which a 'good' does imply an 'ought' because tail-
ure to perform. the good would inTol Te an eTil, is it necenary to suppose that 
the fgood' inoluGes the hidden imperatiTe in terms 01' amotiTe meaning' l.e4 the 
1aperat1 ..... be hidden in the term. 'good" It need not be. The im.peratiTe can be 
hidden in a olau •• that has been auppress«d. GiTen the proposition -this 1s 
go04, If and by • good t in this oontext I mean morally good and good in the 88118. 
that tailure to do it would be eTil, 1 can logioally conolude that I ought to 
do this, sinee I haTe an taplicit understanding (although in this case I haTe 
-
not stated it as the major premise) that "I ought to do good and aToid eTil." 
luoh an approach need not rely upon emotiTe meaning and yet the same results 
are obtai:necl. 
We can oonclude, theretore, with regard. to the logieal problem that Prot. 
IteTenson's aceeptance 01' the bade,logical probi .. is nl1d and meaningf'ul. 
Hi. solution, although it otter. many insights into the nature 01' ethical di.-
put.. for the reason. stated., appears to .utter trom oertain inadequaoies. 
Likewise, .ince the foundation and fundamental sclution is inadequate, the 
bridge that Pro:t. SteT8naon throws up be~n 'Is' and t Ought' is inadequa.te. 
ateTen.on's analysis find. an imperatiTe where there 1. none and oTerloOks one 
that he tail. to express. 
In order _learly to oa.tch the inadequaoies of Prot. SteT.nson's approach, 
we leaTe the plain of the logical and mOTe on to that of the epistemological-
psyohological. Like most other science., logic presupp08es certain epistemolog-
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ical-psychological positions. A consideration ot these positions in relation 
to Prot. Stevenson will clarify much ot what has been said in regard to the 
logical problem. 
As an introduction to ~le problem the distinction between science and 
ethics needs elucidation. This is one place where Stevenson ditfers from his 
grand benetactor. John Dewey. On this point Dewey criticize. Stevenson. for by 
separating science and ethics. he maintains. Stevenson is led to introduce the 
non-cognitive into ethical matters. l3 Like most athicies, Dewey wants to make 
ethics a cognitive mattAJr. "Discussion has aacC\rdlngly focused upcn the alter-
native possibilities of reducing ethics to a acience, thus saving its preten-
sions to rationality, or of accepting the consequence that our commitments to 
norms not only may, but must. be nonrational."l4 As is clear by this time, al-
though he does not exclude from ethical discussion the place of supporting rea. 
sons, Stevenson maintainatnat our commitments to norms must be nonrational 
since an ethical conclusion cannot logically (rationally) be interred from 
empirical premises. 15 
Such a view ot th.e ethical situation entails oertain oonsequenoes. By in-
troducing the nonrational into ethical disoussion. Stevenson lessens the possi-
lSJohn Dewey. "Ethical Subject-Matter and Language." The Journal of Philo-
loehy. XLII (Deo. 20. 1945), pp. 701-712. Dewey does agre. that ethicar-is8ues 
differ from soientifio ones and that oareful attention to the wal in whioh they 
differ 1s needed. He disagrees when Stevenson adds the nonrat1onal ~~ the wale 
l'warner w. Wiok, ~oral Problems, ~oral Philosophy. and Metaethiosl Some 
Further Dogmas of Empiricism," ~ Phil080ehioal !eview, LXlI (Jan. 1953), p. 5. 
15!!!. p. 155. 
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bility of setting down criteria for determining whether one ethicsl deoi'-'ion be 
better than another. In an ethical situation in whioh the conclusion is ration-
ally inferred from pre.iaes. the bet.er decision is the decision flOWing from 
true premise. and a valid inference. But whet criteria cnn be offered for dete 
mining the worthiness of an ethic[,l decision if the decision hangs on emotive 
meaning. Bnd therefore CA~not be rationally inferred? Is not this the 
the methodological analyst CBnnot say that such end such a decision i, better 
than some other? This is the reason that the distinction is rade between norma-
tive ethios and mete-ethios. Yie considered this distinotion earlier. but now Vftt 
.ee it in a olearer light. 
As a mets-ethicisn. Stevenson merely desoribes And clarifies. Thus in his 
rob he must restrict himself to meking mer-ely descriptive jUdgments. As e meta 
ethician. he cannot say that one ethical decision is better than another. and 
as a meta-ethioien it is not necessary th'~t he do 80. Th~ point .. however .. is i 
that. although as a meta-ethlcian Stevenson need not deoide whether one ethioal 
decision be better tha" another. 8S a would-be normative ethic ian (even if at 
80me future deta) he must decide. And given his position. it would seem that he 
oannot rationally say that one ethicel decision is better than another. He has 
to attempt to direct our attitudes in one direction or another, since besides 
being a matter of beUers, the estebl1shing of one ethiorll deoision as better 
than another is flleO e ne.tter of Elttitudes. It is easy to see th,t sunh an 
approach can go on F'ld infinitum. Attitudes are blind. neither true nor fs-lIIe. 
Tj-us. in this n,,!'!"a-t':c!;~l set-up, there fire no criteria for a choice. It is for 
this reason thet 
Y~ny philosophers not only believe that it is not the special 
ooncern of the more 1 phi losophers to say wh', t thing. are good 
or .net actions we should perform; they have alao assu~d that 
the aoceptanoe of a proposed analyail of ethical concepta has no 
implications at all for first order moral attitude •• The latter 
t.taiad:on',their own le~s. If I were to rejeot an intu it10nht meta-
ethica to which 1 hed been oomrdtted previou81y and were 8uddenly 
to turn emotivist, my moral life could rems.in just whet 1* was 
before the ohange, without any absurdity_ I could be tor and 
against the same things, present the same arguments, end in all 
respeots, :lther than the _y in whioh I talk about these proce-
dures, reIlllin morally unohr:nged. No logical oonnection would 
obtain between any set of first-order mo!'ftl views and any !2cond-
order analysis of the formal structure of m~r81 discourse. 
67 
Stevenlon is among these philosophers who I!Ilhtain that their meta-ethical 
theory has no logical oonnection with any set of norlll8.tive decisions. '.i'he que.-
tion to ask is: Does the ecceptfinoe of stevenson's meta-ethioal theory af#ect 
our first-order moral Ufe? If it does, then it rdght well be the case that Prof 
Stevenson's e.~ly8is is inadequp.te, that etl'ics of the norlIJlt1ve v~1r1ety is not 
nonrational a. he proposes, and that there is a logical conneotion be8wean manta 
first and aeoond-order morel life_ 
It seems that the acceptance of Stevenson's meta-ethical theory does affect 
our first-order morsl life. This effeot is observable ft ••• in 6 subtle rnod1fi-
oat ion of our procedures of moral judgment .••• it occurs precisely because the 
theory is not merely an e plicf'thn of our ordl118ry use of ethical worda.,,17 
stevenson's theory is such. From the moment that Stevenson proposes agreement 
or ('isagreement in attitude 88 the distinctive nlfl.rk of an ethical deoision, he 
haa gone beyond the bounds of meta-ethics end steps i'-ito the preM of no~tiv. 
16Frederick A. Olafson, "Meta-ethics and the Moral Life," The Philosophical 
Review, LXV (April 1966), p_ 159. 
17 Ibid., p_ 160. 
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ethios. It is true that nowhere does he say what a man ought to do in this or 
that particular situation, but he has s;ructure4 the ethical situation in teras 
ot teelinga and emotions. In subtly modifying our ordinary procedures of tormu-
lating ethical judgments, Stevenaon's methodology does atteot our first-order 
moral life. Stevenson's meta-ethioa, like most, is not just a characterisation 
ot the logical peculiarities of moral statements. Or rather, because it 1s that, 
it is also a desoription of a certain kind of human activity. And since the co~ 
scious agent who forma the moral judgment and embraces the meta-ethioal theory 
is one and the saae J a performatory analysis of moral statements generaws a 
pefformatory moral life. 
We have aeen how Prot. Steven80n approaches the meaning of ethical terms 
from the aide of belier and attitude, emotive and descriptive meaning, use and 
objectivity. Another approach to the meaning or ethical terms is that of human 
oonsciousneu. Fundamentally, the meaning of ethical terms is tounded on moral 
.elt-consoiousness. Suoh an approach does not overlook the e.otiona, but also 
does not let ttselt be restrioted to the emotional level. Thus " ••• while we 
grant that moral self-consoiousness has a ooncomitant 1n moral ~otioD8 and 
moral .. ntiment., and while we agree that the.e emotions and sentiMnt. have a 
psychoneural basia and are subjeot to psychoneural aberration. we Gontend that 
it is a blunder to contuse th •• e conoomitants with moral aslf-consoiousness it-
8ell.-18 Sinoe we are not .etting dawn a th.ory of our own but merely trying to 
eyaluate Prot. Stevenlon-s, we mention the approach only in passing. Yet suoh 
l8Lonergan, p. 600. For an example of Stevenson's behavioristic leanings 
.e. p. 6S text and footnote 20 of Ethios ~ Language. 
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a paulng indication rest. on the need presented by the iIll\dequs.cy of Steven,e:., 
son', eppr080h j.n which in beh.e.viori*tic faBhion he neglects rf'tlonal ulf-
consciousness without whioh there c:)uld be no ethics at all. 
We are led n.~~ to 8 considerAtion of Prof. Stevenson's epistemology. The 
connection bet1men ethics ~nd episten~ology i8 obvious. "Ethics find epiltemology 
ere 801_Y8 very cl08ely releted. e.nd if we Wflnt to understand our ethics we 
Irust look at our eplstemobgy. It 19 What is stevenson' 8 epistemology? It 1[ very 
clo.ely linked to th*t of Rume. Thus. it is pointed out that "£tevenson 11 
1 d f d th 1 i ,,20 ,uluare Y in the tnr ition 0 Hume. an UI 8. mora skept c •••• IU. vie .. 
of the world .tahes that of Hume, lie hu derived his philosophical tendeDcy to 
" ••••• e. the world in terms of contingently conjoined simples, to see it as a 
totality of ultimate simple factI which have no necessary conne~tion ~th each 
other.nZl Therefore. si~oe the world is a world of unconneoted .1mplea, no 
univerlal order is possible. For thh reason ethio. cannot be in teme of in-
telllg1ble structures and order •• So Hmne plaoes ethio. in the realm of paasion. 
and mor,al sentiment snd stevenson in the realm of emotive meaning and attitude •• 
By thll time it is obvious thpt the ineldequpcies in Prof. Stevenson r 8 8YS-
tem flow from his psychology or leek thereof. This lAok of Po fulbgrown psycho-
19Murd~)oh. p. 113. 
20~_ry Motherlill~ "Moral Knowledf:e," ~ JourM 1 .£!. Philosophy, LVI (Sept. 
10. 1959), p. 756. 
21Murdoch. p. 113. An example of ~tevenson'l view of the world in terma of 
noonneoted simples might be his presentetionof meaning in terms of disposition-
1 property in w"lch siFns are looked upon as isolAted, siMle units. 
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~ogy :ioes not limit itself to Prof'. stevenson. lhe tr,renter ~jority of the ana~· 
~ytie philosophers r;,us-l:; admit it. tor th1a reason Mias Anscombe me.intains thet 
~ ••• it is not profit~ble tor UI at present to do mornl philosophy, that shoul· 
~e laid aSide at my rate until we Mve an adequate philosophy of ps;-chology, in 
~, 22 
,,"uioh we Are oonl9picu,)usly laoking." Suoh an inadequacy acoounts for many of 
~he other shortoomirlbs of Prof. Stevenson's presentation. 
One further comment is needed. A pivotal point of st.·ft.uonts theory is hie 
~otion of agreement and disagreement. He very definitely preoocupies him.elf "itl 
!exactly how ethiCAl disagreement. oan be solved. 81.. aJlalyds uncovers ways of 
~ringing agreement into ethiosl dispute •• But there are other ways of doing this 
~han re.olving d18agree~ent in attitudes to disogreoment. in belief •• One way 
~8 to reoognize thf',t "ultimt.tely. all .ystems of ethios start from oort" in fun-
damental a88umptiono. and unl.ss two r,;ea agree on the Sf\m8 assumption there 11 
no way of removing differenoes of opinion- But 8 commudty 1n which free inquiry 
.Lnto more 1 issues is allowed, i8 bound to disoover more at!'ple bases of moral 
~udgment8 and conduot. just as free diacu8si:n in the field of natural soiences 
~. bound to elil'r'1nate arbitrary opinions. For 80 long as men live in e. OOJilltlllD 
~l'ld A.nd have oorr,mon elements of hUDln nature. their choices e.nd judgments will 
!lgree in proportion aa they are enlightened and recognize this oommon mtture.,,23 
22G. lh M. An.oombe .. "Modern Moral Philosophy. tt Philosophy. X.Z:<IIl (Jan. 
~958). 1. 
23Yorris h. Cohen pnd Ernest Ne.ge1. ~ Ifttroduction~ Logio ~ Scientifio 
~ethod (New York,. 19!11A L 1'_ 366. 
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In .uch a view disegreerr.ent can be resolved by rational means and rptional en-
lightenment end growth. Stevenson's aB91ys1a aeems to overlook this type ot re-
aolution and in so doing points out a certain inadequaoy in the analysis. 
This brings to a olose our evaluation of Prot. Stevenson. We heve found 
oertain lnadequactas in his methodology, theory, end aasumptions. stevenson's 
methodology as behavioristic 18 inadequate to deal with xrsn, men's language, end 
man'. ethioal deciaiona subjectively. Itl u.e lead. Prof. Stevenson to view the 
relation of the ethical and the empirioal inadequately as if they were totally 
unrelated. It allo leads to an inadequ~te conception of meaning ~ meaning and 
ot the types of meaning. The methodology itself' is founded on assumptions which 
are iDadequate, suoh a •• ssuming that true knowled~e il what can be emp1rlcplly 
verified, that reason is e •• entially passive ~nd the emotions active, and limi-
lar aaaumptions. But merely pointing to these inadequttcies and talling to recog-
nize Stevenson's contribution would it.elt be en inadeouacy •. At a time w hen a 
so are of his colleagues were giving up ethioal end moral philosophy 8S hopele .. 
land meaningleee, Prot. Ste,enaon pushed on investig8tions which, because they 
!were extremely specialhed, ran the r1ek of appeflring a waste of time. At a tin:e 
when many & philosopher from another tradition lazily spewed forth ambiguous 
ethioal tenne of aU aorts. Prot. Stevenson set hidelf the teak of clerifying 
ethical terminology. By suoh a method he stirred tho.e of other traditions a180 
to have more conoern about the olarity of language. Hi. enalysi. also points up 
the p~o. of attitude. and emotions in the ethical situations. In reneral the 
ohief value of his work re.t. in pointing out the very real complexity of ~king 
ethioal decisionl and resolving ethical diaagreement. This complexity all ethi-
oian. must admit. 
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